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Planned Parenthood: Adult Adoption and
the Right of Adoptees to Inherit
Richard C. Ausness*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is concerned with the effect of adult adoptions on the
inheritance rights (in the broad sense of that term) of adult adoptees.1
The Article contends many adult adoption statutes assume the existence
of a parent-child relationship in which the adopter is the “parent” and
the adoptee is a “child” even though this is not true of all adult adoption
cases.  In addition, legislatures and courts frequently fail to differentiate
between “quasi-familial” adoptions and “strategic” adoptions, particu-
larly where inheritance rights are concerned.
Part II describes various adoption scenarios.  In the case of minors,
this includes the adoption of unrelated children, the adoption of de-
scendants and collateral relatives and stepchild adoption.  All of these
involve a parent-child relationship that integrates the child into the
adoptive family and gives rise to rights and duties on the part of both
parent and child.  This is not the case with adult adoptions.  Even if
there  has been a parent-child relationship between the parties in the
past, there is no present parent-child relationship, at least in the legal
sense, and the adoption does not necessarily give rise to any rights or
duties.  Instead, adult adoptions are usually concerned with inheritance
rights or other financial benefits.
Part III examines the use of adult adoption in Roman law and its
eventual incorporation into the civil law systems of continental Europe.
It also observes that English common law did not recognize formal
adoptions until 1926, although informal adoption did occur prior to that
time.  Part IV surveys the development of adoption law in the United
States, beginning with the adoption of minors and eventually leading to
statutes authorizing the adoption of adults.
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of
Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968 University of Florida; LL.M. 1973
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1 Technically, inheritance refers to the right of a person, under the laws of descent
and distribution, to take a share of the estate of a decedent who has died without a valid
will.  However, in this Article, inheritance rights will also include the right to take a share
of a class gift contained in an inter vivos trust or a will.
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Part V discusses the right of an adult adoptee to inherit in cases of
intestacy.  It concludes that in most states an adult adoptee can inherit
from and through his or her adoptive parents.  On the other hand, the
right to inherit from the adoptee’s biological family, which was once
commonly recognized, is now generally not allowed.
Part VI examines the right of an adult adoptee to take as the bene-
ficiary of a class gift in a will or trust.  At one time, the “stranger to the
adoption” rule resulted in the exclusion of adoptees from class gifts to
those described as “children,” “issue” or “heirs;” however, the modern
trend is to include those who were adopted as minors in these classes
unless expressly excluded.  However, courts are still reluctant to admit
adult adoptees to these beneficiary classes without a clear indication
that the settlor or testator wants to include them.
Part VII identifies various types of adult adoption and proposes a
series of rules to determine when adult adoptees should be allowed to
take by intestacy or benefit from class gifts in wills or trusts created by
their adoptive parents or by members of their adoptive parents’ family.
Part VIII discusses a few other related issues such as formalities, notice,
termination and terminology relating to adult adoptions.
II. TRADITIONAL ADOPTION AND ADULT ADOPTION
The thesis of this Article is that adult adoption, at least as far as
inheritance rights are concerned, is quite different from the adoption of
a minor.  Nevertheless, adult adoption statutes incorporate many of the
principles that are more relevant to the adoption of minors.  Further-
more, adult adoption statutes and court decisions interpreting them fail
to distinguish between quasi-family adoptions and strategic adoptions
insofar as the right to inherit is concerned.
A. Adoption of Minors
The traditional adoption process, which is primarily based on nine-
teenth century attitudes about the nature of the family structure, as-
sumes that the adoptee is an orphan who will be taken in and reared by
benevolent foster parents.2  In most situations, the child would not be
related in any way to the adoptive parents.  Based on these assumptions,
the traditional adoption process is designed to sever the child’s ties, if
any, with his or her biological family and to fully integrate the child into
the adoptive family.  This is sometimes referred to as the “fresh start”
theory and it is often invoked to terminate an adoptee’s right to inherit
2 See In re Taylor’s Estate, 285 N.W. 538, 539 (Neb. 1939).
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from his or her biological family while expanding the right to inherit
from members of the adoptive family.3
Alternatively, the adoptee may be adopted by a family member
such as a grandparent or collateral relative.  In such cases, there will
usually be an existing family relationship between the adopted child and
the adoptive parent.  Furthermore, the adoptive child will probably have
pre-existing ties with other members of the adoptive family.  For this
reason, the “fresh start” theory does not seem to be particularly applica-
ble.  Therefore, adoptees in such cases usually retain the right to inherit
from his or her biological parents as well as members of the adoptive
family.4
Stepchild adoption is another category of traditional adoption (al-
though it can also apply to adult adoptions).  This form of adoption in-
volves the adoption by a second spouse of a child by a prior marriage of
the other spouse.  In such cases, one of the parents will be the biological
parent of the adopted child and the other will not.  Once again, the
“fresh start” concept does not accurately define the new family relation-
ship.  A provision of the Uniform Probate Code addresses the compli-
cated question of when an adopted child can inherit from a biological
parent.5
Each of the above forms of adoption involves some sort of relation-
ship between the adopted child and the adoptive parent.  This relation-
ship creates rights and duties on both parties similar to the rights and
duties that govern the relationship between parents and their biological
children.  For example, during the adopted child’s minority, the adoptive
parents are expected to provide affection, guidance and support and the
child is expected to love and obey his or her adoptive parents.  These
considerations, rather than inheritance rights, presumably motivate
most childhood adoptions.
B. Adult Adoptions
Adult adoptions are entirely different.  Familial adoptions are usu-
ally motivated by love and affection, but other adoptions are not.  This
distinction should be relevant to the right to of the adult adoptee to
inherit from both the adoptive parent and the adoptive parent’s family.
3 See Jackie Messler, Comment, The Inconsistent Inheritance Rights of Adult
Adoptees and a Proposal for Uniformity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2012).
4 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-119(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
5 Id. § 2-119(b).
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1. Adoptions Related to a Prior Parental or Family Relationship
Adult adoption may occur where a parent-child relationship for-
merly existed between the adoptive parent and an unrelated adoptee.
Often in such cases, a formal adoption during the child’s minority may
not have been possible because the adoptee’s biological parents could
not be found or because one of them withheld consent.6  In such cases,
the adoptee must reach adulthood before the consent requirement is no
longer applicable.
An adoption may also take place between related adults due to the
death of the adoptee’s biological parents or because the parties devel-
oped a close, but non-parental, relationship during the adoptee’s minor-
ity.7  This form of adoption is sometimes employed as a means of
formalizing the entry of the adoptee into the family business.8
Finally, a stepchild adoption can occur between an adult adoptee
and a stepparent.  The common characteristic of these various forms of
adoption is the existence of a parental or family relationship between
the parties and while inheritance rights may be involved, they are not
the sole motivating factor for the adoption.
2. Adoptions Related to an Existing Sexual Relationship
The second type of adult adoption is based on the existence of a
sexual, rather than a parental or family, relationship between the par-
ties.9  One version involves the adoption of one spouse by another.  This
is not legal in some states, but other states do allow it.10  Adoptions of
this sort are rare and are almost always motivated by a desire to create
inheritance rights in the adopted spouse.  A more common type of adult
adoption involves same-sex partners who want to formalize their rela-
tionship in some manner.11  Of course, this does not resemble a conven-
tional adoption since no parent-child relationship is contemplated.
Rather, it represents an attempt by a same-sex couple to establish a
form of marriage substitute and possibly create inheritance rights as
well.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges12
6 See Sarah Ratliff, Note, Adult Adoption: Intestate Succession and Class Gifts
Under the Uniform Probate Code, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1777, 1780 n.19 (2011).
7 See Messler, supra note 3, at 1051-52.
8 See, e.g., Otto v. Gore, 45 A.3d 120, 128-29 (Del. 2012).
9 See Ratliff, supra note 6, at 1805.
10 See In re Tr. Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 460 (Colo. App. 1991); Minary v.
Citizens Fid. Bank & Tr. Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1967); Pennington v. Citizens Fid.
Bank & Tr. Co., 390 S.W.2d 671, 671-72 (Ky. 1965).
11 See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993); In re Adoption
of Patricia S., 976 A.2d 966, 967-68 (Me. 2009); In re Adoption of Spado, 912 A.2d 578,
579-80 (Me. 2007); Ex parte Libertini, 224 A.2d 443, 444-45 (Md. 1966).
12 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
F15/W16] THE RIGHT OF ADOPTEES TO INHERIT 245
has greatly reduced the need for this form of adoption.  Finally, hetero-
sexual partners who do not wish to marry may also chose adoption as a
kind of marriage substitute.13
3. Adoptions by Unrelated Persons for Purposes Other Than
Inheritance
This type of adoption is motivated by non-sexual love and affection.
It usually involves long-time friends or a caregiver and a dependent per-
son.14  Although inheritance rights may be involved, they are not the
principal reason for the adoption.  In addition, people sometimes use
adoption to achieve other economic or strategic goals.  For example,
adoption may affect a party’s right to contest a will,15 to take advantage
of an anti-lapse16 or a pretermitted child17 statute, to make a workers’
compensation claim,18 to seek Social Security benefits,19 to benefit from
rent control regulations20 or to take as the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy.21  In addition, adoption may affect inheritance tax rates22 and it
may also affect the amount that a surviving spouse can receive under
dower23 or elective share24 statutes.
4. Adoptions by Unrelated Persons Principally Intended to
Create Inheritance Rights for One or Both Parties
This form of adult adoption may be viewed as a will substitute.  Un-
fortunately, it has resulted in much litigation when the adoptee seeks to
inherit from a member of the adoptive parent’s family or when the
13 See Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 295 S.W. 896, 897-98 (Ky. 1927).
14 See In re Adoption of Elizabeth P.S. by Eileen C., 509 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (Fam.
Ct. 1986).
15 See In re Williams’ Estate, 36 P. 407, 410 (Cal. 1894); Collamore v. Learned, 50
N.E. 518, 519 (Mass. 1898); In re Heye’s Estate, 269 N.Y.S. 530, 540 (Sur. Ct. Monroe
Cty. 1933); Taylor v. Taylor, 40 S.W.2d 393, 393-96 (Tenn. 1931).
16 See In re Estate of Goulart, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465, 472-74 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); In re
Moore’s Estate, 47 P.2d 533, 534 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935); Warren v. Prescott, 24 A.
948, 949 (Me. 1892); Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 41 N.W.2d 217, 219 (N.D. 1950).
17 See Dreyer v. Schrick, 185 P. 30, 31 (Kan. 1919); In re Estate of Flowers, 848 P.2d
1146, 1147 (Okla. 1993); In re Roderick’s Estate, 291 P. 325, 325-26 (Wash. 1930); In re
Hebb’s Estate, 235 P. 974, 975 (Wash. 1925).
18 See Fairchild Constr. Co. v. Owens, 224 So. 2d 571, 572 (Miss. 1969).
19 See Coker v. Celebrezze, 241 F. Supp. 783, 783-84, 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
20 See 333 E. 53d St. Assocs. v. Mann, 503 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (App. Div. 1986).
21 See Melville v. Wickham, 169 S.W. 1123, 1125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
22 See In re Cook’s Estate, 79 N.E. 991, 993-94 (N.Y. 1907); In re Hagar’s Estate,
126 A. 507, 507-08 (Vt. 1924).
23 See Buckley v. Frazier, 27 N.E. 768, 769 (Mass. 1891).
24 See Atchison v. Atchison’s Ex’rs, 12 S.W. 942, 943-44 (Ky. 1890).
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adoptee seeks to benefit from a class gift in a will or trust created by a
member of the adoptive parent’s family.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Roman Law of Adoption
Adoption, including adult adoption, was commonly practiced in
many ancient cultures.25  As far back as 1750 B.C., adoption is men-
tioned in the Code of the Babylonian King, Hammurabi.26  It appears
from the Bible that some sort of adoption was also practiced by the
Jewish tribes of ancient Israel.27  In ancient Athens, a citizen could
adopt another person either during his lifetime or by will.28  Adoption
was common in ancient Rome and usually involved the adoption of
adult males.29  Wealthy Romans relied on adoption to perpetuate the
family name in cases where a married couple had failed to produce a
male heir.30  Adoption was also used to provide for the continued per-
formance of religious rites to honor family gods and ancestors, a matter
of great importance to the ancient Romans.31
25 See Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 445-46 (1972).
26 See Louis Quarles, The Law of Adoption—A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ. L. REV.
237, 240 (1949).
27 Id. at 239.  According to the Bible, after the death of Esther’s parents, Mordecai,
a relative of her father, adopted Esther and raised her as his own daughter.  See David M.
Smolin, Of Orphans and Adoption, Parents and the Poor, Exploitation and Rescue: A
Scriptural and Theological Critique of the Evangelical Christian Adoption and Orphan
Care Movement, 8 REGENT J. INT’L L. 267, 279-80 (2012).
28 Quarles, supra note 26, at 239.
29 See Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17
FAM. L.Q. 173, 174 (1983).  One reason that women were seldom adopted was because
they could not perpetuate the family name of the adopter. See Paulo Barrozo, Finding
Home in the World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to be Adopted, 55 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 701, 706 (2011).
30 See John Francis Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332
(1922); Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV.
743, 745 (1956).
31 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving: The Child’s Fundamental
Right to Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L REV. 297, 311 (2005); Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood,
Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions,
Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions of Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37
VAND. L. REV. 711, 714 (1984).  The performance of sacra privata, religious observances
or rituals in honor of the family’s ancestors, was a significant obligation for the head of
the family.  Therefore, if the paterfamilias was elderly and likely to die without heirs, it
was necessary for him to acquire a substitute son by adoption who could perform these
rites.  See W. W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW: A
COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 42 (2d ed. 1952); Laura J. Schwartz, Models for Parenthood in
Adoption Law: The French Conception, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1069, 1092 (1995).
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Adoption could also be used to further political objectives.  One of
the strangest examples of this practice involved Publius Claudius
Pulcher.  Claudius wished to become a tribune, but as a member of the
patrician class was barred from holding that office because it was re-
served for plebians.32  The 34-year-old Claudius solved this problem by
having a 20-year-old plebian named Fonteius adopt him.33  Julius Cae-
sar, in his capacity as pontifex maximus, presided over this dubious
adoption ceremony.34  As a newly adopted member of a plebian family,
Claudius, now known as Clodius, was duly elected tribune.35
Finally, Roman emperors often chose their successors by adopting
them.36  For example, in his will, Julius Caesar adopted his great-
nephew, Octavian (subsequently known as Augustus), to legitimize his
succession as ruler.37  Octavian himself adopted his son-in-law, Tiberius,
thereby assuring his succession as emperor.38  Later emperors continued
the practice of adopting their successors as a means of easing their way
to the imperial throne.  Thus, Caligula was adopted by Tiberius;39 Nero
was adopted by Claudius;40 Trajan was adopted by Nerva;41 Antonius
Pius was adopted by Hadrian;42 and Marcus Aurelius was adopted by
Antonius Pius.43
32 Claudius intended to use his power as tribune to prosecute Cicero for executing
members of the Catiline Conspiracy when Cicero served as Consul. See CHRISTIAN
MEIER, CAESAR: A BIOGRAPHY 213-14 (David McLintock trans., 1982).
33 Id. at 213-15. See also ARTHUR D. KAHN, THE EDUCATION OF JULIUS CAESAR:
A BIOGRAPHY, A RECONSTRUCTION 203 (1986).
34 See KAHN, supra note 33, at 203.
35 See ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS 39 (1970).  Unfortu-
nately for Claudius/Clodius, his political career came to an abrupt end when he was mur-
dered in 52 B.C. by henchmen of his political rival, Milo.  Politics could be deadly in those
days. See also MICHAEL GRANT, HISTORY OF ROME 225 (1978).
36 See Smolin, supra note 27, at 290.  Of course, Julius Caesar  never became an
emperor, although he was made dictator for life. See also KAHN, supra note 33, at 203.
However, Octavian assumed the title of princeps along with the honorific Augustus given
to him by the Roman Senate.
37 See 1 T. RICE HOLMES, THE ARCHITECT OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 10 (AMS Press,
Inc. 1977) (1928); see KAHN, supra note 33, at 203; E.S. Shuckburgh, Augustus Caesar 16
(1995).
38 See E.S. Shuckburgh, Augustus Caesar 255 (1995); see also Michael Grant, The
Twelve Caesars 85 (1975).  Curiously, Augustus also adopted his wife, Livia, in his will,
bestowing on her the name Julia Augusta.
39 See Smolin, supra note 27, at 292.
40 See Michael Grant, Nero 25 (Dorset Press 1989) (1970); see also Miriam T. Grif-
fin, Nero: The End of a Dynasty 96 (1984).
41 See GRANT, supra note 35, at 293-94.
42 See Stewart Perowne, Hadrian 178 (Greenwood Press 1976) (1960).
43 See GRANT, supra note 35, at 353.
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Roman law recognized two forms of adoption, adrogation and
adoption.44  In either case, the adoptee would take the name of his new
father, while keeping his old family name as a surname.45  Furthermore,
the adoptee would become subject to the potestas of the adopter.46  The
more ancient of the two procedures, adrogatio or adrogation, was re-
served for persons who were sui juris, that is, not subject to power of a
paterfamilias.47  During the republican period, adrogation involved two
stages.  First, the college of pontiffs conducted a preliminary investiga-
tion to determine if the adopter could no longer have children.48  If the
pontiffs approved, the petition was submitted to an assembly of the peo-
ple known as the comitia curiata.49  Both the adopter and the adoptee
had to appear before the comitia and agree to the adoption.  Thereupon,
the comitia curiata on behalf of the Roman people would give its ap-
proval to the adoption.50
The second form of adoption or adoptio was employed by those
who were alieni juris, that is, subject to the partia potestas or parental
power of the father even though they were adults.51  This involved the
biological father “selling” his son three times to a third party by a proce-
dure known as mancipatio.52  Each time the sale took place, the buyer
would manumit the adoptee, thereby reestablishing the biological fa-
44 See Walter J. Wadlington, III, Minimum Age Difference as a Requisite for Adop-
tion, 1966 Duke L.J. 392, 395 (1966).
45 See Brosnan, supra note 30, at 333.
46 See Barrozo, supra note 29, at 706; see also Presser, supra note 25, at 447.  See
Watson, supra note 35, at 37-39, for a discussion of the patria potestas, or power of the
father.
47 See Quarles, supra note 26, at 240.
48 See Watson, supra note 35, at 39. The adopter had to be at least sixty years old
and must have tried to procreate when he was younger and presumably able to have
children.  Furthermore, because adoption meant that the adoptee was merged into the
family of the adopter, some provision would have to be made to ensure that the domestic
cult of the adoptee’s family was continued. See also H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduc-
tion to the Study of Roman Law 119-20 (1932).
49 See Huard, supra note 30, at 745.  Roman citizens divided themselves into thirty
groups called curiae.  The curiae were further divided into three groups of ten.  Each
group or tribus provided a squadron of cavalry.  During the late Republican period, the
comitia curiata primarily exercised various religious functions, including rituals associated
with adrogation. See Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitu-
tional History 9-10 (J.M. Kelly trans., 6th ed. 1973).  Originally, only Roman citizens
could adopt by adrogation because they alone were members of the comitia. See Buck-
land & McNair, supra note 31, at 42. Women were also barred from using this procedure
to adopt or be adopted for the same reason.  See Quarles, supra note 26 at 240.
50 See Watson, supra note 35, at 39.  The term “adrogatio” takes its name from the
rogatio or bill that was submitted to the comitia. See Jolowicz, supra note 48, at 119.
51 See Jolowicz, supra note 48, at 119.
52 See Watson, supra note 35, at 38.
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ther’s potestas.53  After the third sale, however, the father’s patria potes-
tas would be lost.54  The adoptive parent would then bring an action
against the third party who now held the adoptee in mancipio, claiming
that the adoptee was his son.55  Since the entire process was collusive in
nature, the third party would not contest the adoptive father’s claim and
the praetor would declare that the adoptee was now the son of the adop-
tive parent.56  This judgment would effectively invest the adoptive par-
ent with patria potestas over the adoptee.57
It can be seen that adoption in ancient Rome was not particularly
concerned with the nurturing of small children as are most adoptions in
this country.  Instead, adoption usually involved adult males and was
chiefly concerned with the perpetuation of religious rites or the preser-
vation of the adopter’s family.58  Nor was this view of adoption confined
to Rome; it eventually spread to much of continental Europe as well.
B. Continental Europe
After the fall of the Roman Empire, formal adoptions became less
common, although they did not disappear completely.59  During the me-
dieval and early modern periods, adoption was primarily used as a
means of ensuring the succession of the adopter’s property when he had
no children.60  In such cases, adoptees were generally related to the
adopter.  In addition, adopters who had no legitimate children some-
times tried to legitimize their illegitimate children by means of adoption
in order to pass their property on to them.61  Adoption was also some-
times employed to cut off the rights of collateral relatives by adopting a
grandchild or other remote relative and thereby reducing the degree of
kinship between them.62  However, in most parts of continental Europe
feudal customary law required the successor of a feudal tenant to be a
lineal descendant, a requirement that could not be satisfied by adop-
53 See id. at 38-39.
54 See Jolowicz, supra note 48, at 119.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See Quarles, supra note 26, at 240; see also In re Appeal of Woodward, 70 A. 453,
455-56 (Conn. 1908).  Later, in the reign of Justinian, this procedure was replaced by one
where the three parties simply appeared before a magistrate. See Brosnan, supra note 30,
at 332; see Howe, supra note 29, at 174.
58 See Presser, supra note 25, at 452.
59 See Joseph W. McKnight, The Shifting Focus of Adoption, in CRITICAL STUDIES
IN ANCIENT LAW, COMPARATIVE AND LEGAL HISTORY 297, 299 (John W. Cairns &
Olivia F. Robinson eds., 2001).
60 Id. at 299, 303.
61 Id. at 302.
62 Id. at 303.
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tion.63  In all likelihood, this explains why adoption does not appear to
have been widely practiced during this period.64
Nevertheless, the influence of Roman law, including the institution
of adult adoption, gradually gained acceptance in much of continental
Europe, especially in Italy, France and Spain.  For example, a study of
litigation in northern Italy during the sixteenth and seventeen centuries
by Professor Joseph McKnight revealed a large number of adult adop-
tion cases.65  Formal adoptions were rare in France prior to the French
Revolution.66  However, in 1804 the Napoleonic Code or Code Civil es-
tablished a formal adoption procedure.67  The Code clearly authorized
the adoption of adults since it provided that no adoption could take
place until the adoptee had reached the age of majority.68  French legis-
lation now distinguishes between the adoption of children (adoption
plénière) and adult adoption (adoption simple).69
In Germany prior to its unification in 1871, the various German
states maintained their own legal systems, and a number of them, such
as Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Baden, enacted laws authorizing child-
hood adoption in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.70  In 1900,
the new the German Civil Code established a formal procedure for
adoption, which apparently authorized adult adoptions.71  Spain also ap-
63 Id. at 302.
64 Id. at 303.
65 Id. at 301.
66 See Sheryl L. Sultan, Note, The Right of Homosexuals to Adopt: Changing Legal
Interpretations of “Parent” and “Family”, 10 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 45, 50-51 (1995).
However, research by Kristin Elizabeth Gager into local public records in France indi-
cates that childless couples often adopted abandoned or destitute children during this
period. See KRISTIN ELIZABETH GAGER, BLOOD TIES AND FICTIVE TIES: ADOPTION
AND FAMILY LIFE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 8 (1996).
67 See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1093.
68 See Sultan, supra note 66, at 51.  However, the Code did prepare the way for the
eventual adoption of minors by creating something called an officious tutorship. See
Brosnan, supra note 30, at 334.
69 See RACHEL G. FUCHS, CONTESTED PATERNITY: CONSTRUCTING FAMILIES IN
MODERN FRANCE, 235-36 (2008).
70 See Harry D. Krause, Creation of Relationships of Kinship, in IV INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 74 (Aleck Chloros et al. ed., 1976).
71 See Brosnan, supra note 30, at 334.  Apparently, as the experience of Nazi foreign
minister Joachim von Ribbentrop illustrates, adult adoption could be used to acquire
noble status.  In 1925, Gertrud von Ribbentrop, a Prussian aristocrat, adopted her 32-
year-old relative, thereby enabling him to add the coveted prefix “von” to his name.  In
return, Joachim provided her with a generous pension. See JOHN WEITZ, HITLER’S DIP-
LOMAT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP 8 (1992).  More recently,
Zsa Zsa Gabor’s husband, Prince Frederic von Anhalt, obtained his title of “prince” by
adoption.  Another example of social climbing through adoption involves Ilonka Kere-
kes, an Austrian citizen, who changed her name to Ilonka Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein
after being adopted as an adult by a German prince. See Hadas Alexandra Jacobi, Note,
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parently recognized adoption, including adult adoption, and imported
the practice to its American colonies.72
C. England
It is often claimed that the common law of England did not recog-
nize the concept of adoption.73  In that country, inheritance was re-
stricted to heirs of the blood.74  Although strangers were sometimes
taken in to English families and treated as natural children, there was no
legal procedure available for the parties to formalize their relationship
and these children had no right to inherit their adoptive parents’ prop-
erty.75  It was not until 1926, when Parliament passed the Adoption of
Children Act,76 that adoption was officially authorized.77  England’s
most recent adoption law, the Adoption and Children Act of 2002, de-
clares that only children below that age of eighteen can be adopted.78
IV. ADULT ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Legal adoption did not take root in the United States until the mid-
nineteenth century.79  Furthermore, the earliest adoption statutes were
concerned with the adoption of minor children and either failed to men-
tion the possibility of adult adoption or expressly excluded it.80  In most
cases, statutes expressly allowing the adoption of adults did not appear
until the twentieth century.81
A. Adoption of Minor Children
Although no state enacted a general adoption statute until the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, quasi-adoptions of children took place in
A Fürstin By Any Other Name?  European Citizenship and the Limits of Individual
Rights in the E.C.J., 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 643, 646 (2011).
72 See Huard, supra note 30, at 747-48.
73 See Brosnan, supra note 30, at 335.
74 See Huard, supra note 30, at 745-46.
75 Id. at 746.
76 Id.  See also Adoption of Children Act 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5 c. 29 (Eng.)
77 However, the Elizabethan Poor Laws provided that orphans and impoverished
children could be indentured as apprentices where they would become members of their
master’s household and be taught a useful trade. See Presser, supra note 25, at 453-55;
Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance
or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 923 (1991).
78 In 1962, Somerset Maugham adopted his secretary, Alan Searle.  However, the
adoption took place in France. See TED MORGAN, MAUGHAM: A BIOGRAPHY 607
(1980).
79 See Brosnan, supra note 30, at 335.
80 See Dickson, supra note 77, at 924; Brosnan, supra note 30, at 335-36.
81 Adult Adoption, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 253, 255 (1972).
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America prior to that time just as they did in England.82  In some cases,
relatives took in orphans and raised them as their own.83  In the South,
wealthy couples sometimes allowed orphans who were not relatives to
live with them as family members.84  Finally, during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, children were often “put out” to family members
to be educated or trained as apprentices.85
Prior to 1851, legal adoptions were uncommon.86  However, it was
possible in some states to obtain legislative approval of an adoption by
means of special legislation.87  In addition, Texas and Louisiana recog-
nized formal adoptions that had been obtained pursuant to Spanish or
French law when those states were subject foreign control.88  However,
the first general adoption law was enacted by the state of Massachusetts
in 1851.89  The statute provided that the adopted child would be treated
as though he or she had been born to the adoptive parents in lawful
wedlock and required a finding that the adopting parents had the capac-
ity to bring up the child and provide the child with adequate nurture and
education.90  A large number of states followed suit and by 1931 all of
them had enacted general adoption statutes for children.91
B. Adoption of Adults
Adult adoption was relatively rare in the nineteenth century.  How-
ever, by the middle of the twentieth century, most states allowed it, ei-
ther by a specific statute or by judicial interpretation their general
adoption statutes.
82 See Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 315.
83 See Presser, supra note 25, at 457-58.
84 See id.
85 See Dickson, supra note 77, at 923.
86 But see Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAM. L. 677, 695
(1982) (arguing that “[t]he practice of adoption in the colonial period was more prevalent
than has thus far been realized.”).  According to Professor Kawashima, an early example
of adult adoption in America occurred in 1643 when a certain Robert Lawson, in his will,
adopted his friend, Robert West, and made him his heir. Id. at 689.
87 See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1105-
06 (2003).
88 See Huard, supra note 30, at 747.
89 See Brosnan, supra note 30, at 335.  Mississippi enacted a general adoption law in
1846, but it was not as comprehensive as that of Massachusetts. See Huard, supra note
30, at 748.
90 Cahn, supra note 87, at 1112-14.
91 See Mindy Schulman Roman, Note, Rethinking Revocation: Adoption from a New
Perspective, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 737 (1995).
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1. Judicial Recognition of Adult Adoption
At one time, some courts refused to allow adults to be adopted in
the absence of language in the state’s adoption statute specifically al-
lowing it.92 Appeal of Ritchie93 involved an appeal from a lower court’s
refusal to allow a 65-year-old widower to adopt a 26-year-old male,
Robert Hun Hee Pai, in order to make him his son and heir.94  On ap-
peal, the Nebraska Supreme Court observed that the state’s statutory
adoption procedure only applied to the adoption of a “minor child.”95
The petitioners contended that the trial court, in the exercise of its equi-
table powers, could have authorized Pai’s adoption notwithstanding the
statutory language restricting adoption to minor children.96  However,
the court reiterated the conventional view that adoption was purely stat-
utory in nature and that courts were not free to expand the scope the
state’s adoption statutes.97  Accordingly, it affirmed the lower court’s
decision.98
More recently, the Alabama Supreme Court applied similar reason-
ing in Doby v. Carroll.99  In that case, Kenneth Doby, then 23 years old,
was adopted by Clara McCallister, an adult who died soon thereafter.100
After her death, the guardian of McCallister’s estate sought to annul the
probate court’s adoption order on the grounds that Alabama did not
authorize the adoption of an adult.101  After a hearing on the matter, the
probate court set aside the adoption and Doby appealed.102  The appel-
late court began by observing that the right to adopt was purely statu-
tory and “unless the statute by express provision or necessary
implication confers the right of adoption, such right does not exist.”103
The court acknowledged that the Alabama court in Sheffield v. Frank-
lin104 had ruled that the use of the word “child” in the 1886 Code re-
92 See, e.g., Doby v. Carroll, 147 So. 2d 803, 805 (Ala. 1962); First Nat’l Bank of St.
Petersburg v. Mott, 133 So. 78, 79 (Fla. 1931); Bartholow v. Davies, 114 N.E. 1017, 1019-
20 (Ill. 1916); In re Appeal of Ritchie, 53 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Neb. 1952); In re Moore, 14
R.I. 38, 38 (1882).
93 In re Ritchie, 53 N.W.2d at 753.
94 Id. at 754.  Ritchie offered evidence of a contract in which Ritchie agreed to
adopt Pai and devise certain property to him if Pai changed his surname to “Ritchie.” Id.
at 755.
95 Id. at 755.
96 Id. at 755-56.
97 Id. at 756.
98 Id.
99 147 So. 2d 803 (Ala. 1962).
100 Id. at 803.
101 Id. at 804.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.  See also Sheffield v. Franklin, 44 So. 373, 374 (Ala. 1907).
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ferred to the status of the adoptee and did not require that the adoptee
be a minor.  However, the court determined that the statute involved in
the Sheffield case had been superseded in 1931 by a new adoption stat-
ute which referred the adoption of a “minor child.”105  Therefore, the
court concluded that the 1931 statute, which was in effect at the time of
Doby’s adoption, did not authorize the probate court to permit the
adoption of an adult.106
However, other courts have interpreted general adoption statutes
to allow the adoption of adults as well as minors.107  One of the earliest
decisions to uphold an adult adoption was Collamore v. Learned,108 de-
cided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1898.  In Col-
lamore, certain relatives of John Collamore challenged the adoption of
three adult nieces and nephews.109  The petitioners contended that the
adoption was an invalid will substitute whose sole purpose was to pre-
vent them from contesting Collamore’s will.110  In response, the court
declared that Collamore could dispose of his property as he saw fit and
was free to adopt his nieces and nephews and make them his heirs.111
Scott v. Peters112 involved the adoption of a 32-year-old married
woman by John W. Penn.  After Penn died intestate in 1924, a niece and
grandniece challenged the validity of the adoption.113  In response to the
heirs’ argument that the statute did not allow for the adoption of an
adult, the court pointed to a provision that required parental consent for
the adoption of a minor child.114  According to the court, this implied
that the statute distinguished between the adoption of a minor, where
parental consent was required, and the adoption of an adult, where it
was not.115
State ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun116 also involved the adoption of a
married woman.  The trial judge dismissed the relator’s petition to adopt
a 31-year-old married woman even though she and her husband con-
105 Doby v. Carroll, 147 So. 2d 803, 804-05 (Ala. 1962).
106 Id. at 805.
107 See, e.g., Sheffield, 44 So. at 374; Scott v. Peters, 158 N.E. 490, 491 (Ind. App.
1927); Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518, 518 (Mass. 1898); State ex rel. Buerk v. Cal-
houn, 52 S.W.2d 742, 742-43 (Mo. 1932); In re Moran’s Estate, 52 S.W. 377, 378 (Mo.
1899); Melville v. Wickham, 169 S.W. 1123, 1125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
108 50 N.E. 518, 518-19 (Mass. 1898).
109 Id. at 518.
110 Id. at 519.
111 Id.




116 52 S.W.2d 742, 742 (Mo. 1932).
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sented to the adoption.117  The trial judge found that the court did not
have the power to authorize the adoption of an adult and the relator
brought a mandamus action to compel the judge to grant the adop-
tion.118  On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged that the
adoption statute referred to the person seeking to be adopted as a
“child” rather than a “person.”119  However, the court concluded that
the word “child” was used “in the sense of its relation to the word ‘par-
ent’ and does not signify minority.”120  Furthermore, the court pointed
out that another provision of the adoption statute declared that parental
consent was needed to adopt a person under the age of 21, thereby sug-
gesting that persons over the age of 21 could be adopted without paren-
tal consent.121  Consequently, the court ordered the lower court to hold
a hearing on the adoption petition.122
2. Adult Adoption Statutes
Most states have now enacted statutes that expressly allow adults to
be adopted.123  Adult adoption procedures are normally much simpler
than those that apply to the adoption of minors.124 For example, in adult
adoption cases, many statutes do not require an extensive inquiry into
whether a proposed adoption is in the “best interests” of the adoptee.125
Nor is parental consent typically required as it is in the case of the adop-
tion of a minor.126
a. Requirements, Restrictions and Prohibitions
Some states restrict adult adoption or impose requirements or
prohibitions on the practice.  For example, a few states require the pres-
ence of a pre-existing parent-child relationship between the adopting





121 Id. at 743.
122 Id.
123 See Brynne E. McCabe, Note, Adult Adoption: The Varying Motives, Potential
Consequences, and Ethical Considerations, 22 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 300, 302 (2009).
See also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5-101(a), 9 U.L.A. 109-10 (1994).
124 See Chelsi Honeycutt, Comment, Careful Cutting Too Many Ties: Issues with Es-
tablishing a Parent-Child Relationship via Adoption in Texas and a Potential Solution, 5
EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 171, 174 (2012).
125 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1098-99 (Del. 1993).
126 Angela Chaput Foy, Adult Adoption and the Elder Population, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S
ADVISOR 109, 117 (2006).
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sent to the adoption.  A few states also prohibit gay couples or hetero-
sexual lovers from adopting one another.
i. Pre-existing parent-child relationship
A number of adult adoption statutes follow the Roman principle
“adoptio naturam imitatur” (adoption imitates nature)127 and require
the adopting parent to be a certain number of years older that the
adopted child.128  This issue arose several years ago in New Jersey where
a court refused to allow an adult adoption. In re Adoption of L.C.129
involved an attempt by a childless married couple, aged 50 and 53, to
adopt an unmarried 52-year-old disabled woman.130  New Jersey’s adult
adoption statute declared that an adoption would not be granted unless
“there is an age difference of at least 10 years between adopting parents
and the adoptee . . . .”131  According to the court, the legislature im-
posed this requirement because it wanted to ensure some semblance of
a traditional parent-child relationship between the parties to the adop-
tion.132  At the same time, the statute permitted a court to waive this
requirement if it found that the best interests of the adoptee would be
promoted by the adoption.133
Since the parties failed to satisfy the statute’s age difference re-
quirement, the court considered the best interest question.  Conceding
that there was no case law on this issue in New Jersey, the court turned
to New York and Delaware for guidance.134  Although the adult adop-
tion statutes in these states did not have an age difference requirement,
they did require that a parent-child relationship exist between the par-
ties prior to the adoption and concluded that the New Jersey adoption
statute also required the existence of a parent-child relationship when
the age difference requirement was not met.135  In this case, the parties
never characterized their relationship as that of parents and child, but
rather insisted that they operated as a “team of equals.”136  Further-
more, the parties did not seek adoption for the purpose of creating in-
127 See Wadlington, supra note 44, at 394.
128 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-734(a) (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (2016);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.190(1) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22-2 (2015); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.2-1243 (2016); see also McCabe, supra note 123, at 302-03.
129 920 A.2d 155, 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2006).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 157 (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22-2).
132 See id. at 158.
133 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 22-2.
134 See In re Adoption of L.C., 920 A.2d 155, 159 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2006).
135 Id. at 159-61.
136 Id. at 161.
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heritance rights or providing for perpetual care.137  In sum, the court
found no evidence that the purpose of the adoption was to promote the
interests of the adoptee.138  Therefore, it denied the adoption
petition.139
Some states expressly condition adult adoption on the pre-existence
of a prior parent-child relationship between the adopting parties or re-
quire that the adoptive child reside in the adoptive parent’s household
for a certain period of time.140  The first requirement is illustrated by In
re Adoption of Huitzil.141  In that case, Donald and Patricia Kaufman, a
married couple, petitioned to adopt an eighteen-year-old orphan.142
Prior to reaching his majority, Mr. Hiutzel lived with his older brother, a
college student at Miami University.143  However, he also ate meals with
the Kaufmans and developed a close friendship with them and their chil-
dren.144  Nevertheless, the lower court dismissed the petition, finding
that Huitzil’s relationship with the Kaufmans did not constitute a child-
foster parent relationship as required by the statute.145
The appeals court found that while the petitioners provided Huitzil
with a great deal of guidance and emotional support, they did not make
any substantial contribution to his support, education or medical care.146
Furthermore, Huitzil did not reside with the Kaufmans, nor did they
raise, train or discipline him as they would have done with one of their
own children.147  For this reason, the court concluded that there was no
parent-child relationship between the petitioners and Huitzil as required
by the statute and, therefore, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the
adoption petition.148
On the other hand, in In re the Adoption of Elizabeth P.S. by Eileen
C., a New York court concluded that the parties had formed the requi-




140 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1501(1) (2016); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3 (2016);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-101(2) (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(B)(3) (LexisNexis
2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-18 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1243 (2016); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-22-102(b) (2015).
141 504 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).




146 Id. at 1176.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1177.
149 509 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
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petitioned to adopt Elizabeth, a 48-year-old woman.150  Eileen met Eliz-
abeth while working at a private facility for troubled females operated
by her religious order.151  Eileen counseled Elizabeth, taught her to read
and otherwise looked after her at the facility.152  When Eileen left the
religious order on leave, she took Elizabeth with her.153  The two wo-
men maintained a mother-daughter relationship for more than twenty
years.154  The court noted that the New York Court of Appeals had re-
cently held that a parent-child relationship was necessary for one adult
to adopt another.155  However, it concluded that, in this case, the rela-
tionship was not a sexual one, but rather amounted to a “healthy parent-
child union within the meaning of Article VII of the Domestic Relations
Law.”156
ii. Consent of parents or spouses
Some statutes require the consent of certain parties to the adoption
or at least notice to them.  Failure to do so may allow these parties to
contest or annul the adoption.  Depending on the particular state these
parties may include the adoptee’s parents, the adopter’s spouse or, if the
adoptee is married, the adoptee’s spouse.
Most adoption statutes require the biological parents to be notified
of an adoption and be given the opportunity to object or consent to it
when the adoptee is a minor.  However, a few states also require paren-
tal consent or notice when the adoptee is an adult.157  For example, in
the Scott case,158 the lower court dismissed an adoption petition for fail-
ure to conform to the statutory requirements.159  On appeal, the court
observed that Florida’s adult adoption statute required that the peti-
tioner provide the court with either “[w]ritten consent . . . executed by
the natural parent or parents, if any, or proof of service of process . . .
150 Id. at 746-47.
151 Id. at 747.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 746.
155 Id. at 747 (citing In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y.
1984)).
156 Id. at 748.
157 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Scott, 344 So. 2d 884, 884-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); In re Adoption of an Adult by V.A., 683 A.2d 591, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1996).  On the other hand, most courts have refused to impose a parental notification or
consent requirement in the absence of a statutory provision. See Ala. Dep’t of Human
Res. v. B.V., 59 So. 3d 700, 708-09 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010); In re Adoption of Miller, 227
So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); In re Adoption of Chaney, 887 P.2d 1061, 1064
(Idaho 1995); Bridges v. Nicely, 497 A.2d 142, 147-48 (Md. 1985).
158 See In re Scott, 344 So. 2d at 884-85.
159 Id. at 885.
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showing notice has been served on the parent or parents . . . . ”160  Since
the petitioner failed to provide evidence of parental consent or notice,
the court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the adoption
petition.161
Quite a few states require the consent of the adopter’s spouse if the
adopter is married.162 In re O’Keefe163 provides an interesting example
of this.  In that case, Isabella Jacobie, the widow of Walter Jacobie,
sought to vacate his adoption of an adult woman named Helen
O’Keefe.164  It appears that Walter had claimed to be a widower in his
adoption petition.165  The Surrogate Court agreed that Isabella’s con-
sent was required and, therefore, vacated its earlier adoption order.166
The spousal consent requirement was also involved in the Adoption
of Sewall case.167  In 1952, Charles Keeler, aged 72, adopted Eleanor
Sewall, a 45-year-old widow and mother of two daughters.168  When
Charles died in 1964, his will, executed shortly after the adoption, left
his entire estate to Eleanor.169  Ellen Schaefer, a niece, contested the
will and also sought to set aside the adoption decree, claiming fraud and
undue influence.170  Leila Keeler, a former spouse, also argued that the
adoption was invalid.171  Although Leila and Charles had obtained a
Nevada divorce in 1943, Leila contended that the divorce was invalid
and that she was still married to Charles at the time of his death.172
Since Leila did not consent to Eleanor’s adoption as required by state
law, she argued that the adoption should be nullified.173  Affirming the
lower court, the California appeals court held that Leila’s divorce was
160 Id. at 885 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 63.062(3)(b) (1975)).
161 Id. at 886.
162 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.040(b) (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
8101(C) (2016); CAL. FAM. CODE § 9301 (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-734(c),
(e) (2016); FLA. STAT. § 63.062(8)(a) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 16-1504(h) (2016); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-2113 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-4-403(1)(c) (2015); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-101(2) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.200(2) (2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 110 (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-5-102(a)(2) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-15-05(2) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-1120 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-
116(1)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2015); WIS. STAT. § 882.02 (2015).
163 300 N.Y.S. 27, 30 (Sur. Ct. Saratoga Cty. 1937).
164 Id. at 28.
165 Id. at 29.
166 Id. at 31.
167 In re Adoption of Sewall, 51 Cal. Rptr. 367, 371 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
168 Id. at 370.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 371-72.
171 Id. at 371.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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valid and, as such, she had no standing to contest the adoption.174  The
court also concluded that Ellen did not have standing to challenge the
adoption regardless of Leila’s marital status, although as the closest
blood relative of Charles, she could contest his will.175
Although a married adult can be adopted,176 a few states require
that the adoptee’s spouse consent to the adoption.177  For example, in
McComesky’s Adoption,178 the petitioner, a resident of the National
Military Home in Dayton, Ohio, proposed to adopt an adult woman.179
The court observed that the adoption statute permitted the adoption of
an adult, but required the consent of the adoptee’s spouse if he or she
was married.180  Since the adoption petition did not indicate whether the
adoptee was married or not, and no spousal consent had been given, the
court refused to approve the adoption.181
Another Pennsylvania case, In re Mullany’s Adoption,182 provides a
helpful gloss on the purpose behind the spousal consent requirement.
In 1896, Ellen Euker adopted her adult nephew, Timothy Mullany.183
Mullany’s parents died while he was very young and he lived with his
aunt until he reached adulthood and married.184  Ellen Euker died intes-
tate in 1900 and Timothy, who had taken his aunt’s last name at the time
of his adoption, claimed her entire estate as her son under the intestacy
statute.185  Realizing that Timothy’s wife, Margaret, has not given her
consent to the adoption in writing, Margaret gave the court a sworn
statement that she had given her consent at the time of the adoption,
though not in writing.186  The court permitted her to give her consent in
this manner “nunc pro tunc.”187
Meanwhile, three of Ellen’s siblings also claimed her estate, arguing
that the court had no jurisdiction to grant Ellen’s petition because
174 Id. at 372-74.
175 Id. at 374-81.
176 See Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 295 S.W. 896, 898 (Ky. 1927).
177 See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.040(b) (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-8101(C)
(2016); CAL. FAM. CODE § 9302(a) (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-735 (2016);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1504(h) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.200(2) (2015); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:3(III) (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-05(2) (2015).
178 In re McComeskey’s Adoption, 14 Pa. D. 420, 420 (Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. 1905).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 420-21.




185 Id. at 562.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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Timothy’s wife, Margaret, had not consented in writing to the adop-
tion.188  However, the court rejected this argument.  It distinguished be-
tween the adoption of a minor and the adoption of an adult.189  In the
case of a minor child, someone competent to contract, such as a parent
or guardian, is needed to give the required consent because the child is
not legally capable to doing do.190  However, an adult is capable of giv-
ing legal consent and no one else’s consent is needed to give it valid-
ity.191  Because adoption imposes certain obligations on the part of the
adoptee, the requirement that the adoptee’s spouse consent to the adop-
tion is intended solely to protect his or her interests.192  Accordingly,
since Margaret’s rights were the only one’s affected by her failure to
consent in the proper manner, the court reasoned that only she had
standing to complain of any irregularity in the adoption procedure.193
For this reason, the court refused to revoke Timothy’s adoption.194
b. Restrictions and Prohibitions
Most adult adoption statutes impose few restrictions on who may
be adopted.  In fact, it is not unusual for people to adopt close rela-
tives,195 stepchildren196 or in-laws.197  However, a few states impose re-
strictions on who can adopt or be adopted.198  For example, some states
188 Id.
189 Id. at 562-63.
190 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 563.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 566.
195 See Coker v. Celebreeze, 241 F. Supp. 783, 785 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (grandchild); In
re P.A.L. von R., 5 P.3d 390, 391 (Colo. App. 2000) (sister); In re Adoption of Holland,
965 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (grandson); Browder v. Harmeyer, 453
N.E.2d 301, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (grandson); In re Succession of Caldwell, 38 So. 140,
140 (La. 1905) (niece); Evans v. McCoy, 436 A.2d 436, 438 (Md. 1981) (cousin); In re
Adoption of Bertson, 206 N.W.2d 28, 29 (Minn. 1973) (mother); In re Tr. Created Under
Agreement with Lane, 660 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (nephew); Hurt v.
Noble, 817 P.2d 744, 745 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991) (grandchildren).
196 See In re Adoption of Chaney, 887 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Idaho 1995); Faville v. Burns,
960 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Satterfield v. Bonyhady, 446 N.W.2d 214, 215
(Neb. 1989); In re Adoption of an Adult, 683 A.2d 591, 591 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1996); In re Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 719 (Morris Cty. Ct. 1976); Hagaman v.
Morgan, 886 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App. 1994). But see Hays v. Hays, 946 So. 2d 867, 869
(Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (holding that statute allowing adoption of adult stepchildren did
not apply to husband’s daughter after husband’s death because stepmother-stepdaughter
relationship no longer existed).
197 See In re Estate of Fortney, 611 P.2d 599, 600-01 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (wife’s
nephew).
198 See Honeycutt, supra note 124, at 173.
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have refused to allow one spouse to adopt another, at least for purposes
of securing an inheritance, either by statute199 or by court decision.200
Similarly, at least a few courts have refused to allow adoption between
unmarried heterosexual partners.201  In addition, in the past, at least one
state refused to allow gay or lesbian couples to formalize their relation-
ship by means of adoption.202
i. Heterosexual relations between adopting parties
One can argue that adoption of a lover is an “undesirable social
use” of the adoption process.203  Nevertheless, there are few cases
where courts have inquired very seriously about whether the adopting
parties were engaged in a sexual relationship.  In one instance, in Ste-
vens v. Halstead,204 a New York court allowed the next of kin of the
adopter to try to set aside an adoption on grounds of fraud and undue
influence.205  The plaintiff contended that the adoptee, a 47-year-old
married woman, was the mistress of the 70-year-old adopter.206  Al-
though the court did not hold that a sexual relationship per se was suffi-
cient to invalidate an adoption, it did declare that “[s]urely it is against
public policy to admit a couple living in adultery to the relation of par-
ent and child.”207  Furthermore, the court continued, “[t]his meretri-
cious relationship, and the undue influence which imposed the will of
defendant on decedent, condemn the adoption.”208
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in In re Jones209 went even fur-
ther and concluded that the existence of a sexual relationship was incon-
sistent with a valid adoption.  In that case, a 30-year-old married man,
Duncan Fraser, sought to adopt a 20-year-old woman named Karen
Jones.210  Duncan was apparently the father of Karen’s child as well as
199 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-4-402(1) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.190(1)
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-5-101 (2016).
200 See In re Tr. Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 460 (Colo. App. 1991); Minary v.
Citizens Fid. Bank & Tr. Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 341, 344 (Ky. 1967); Pennington v. Citizens
Fid. Bank & Tr. Co., 390 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Ky. 1965). But see Successions of Plummer v.
Plummer, 577 So. 2d 751, 753, 755 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
201 See Stevens v. Halstead, 168 N.Y.S. 142, 143-44 (App. Div. 1917); In re Jones, 411
A.2d 910, 911 (R.I. 1980).
202 See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984).
203 See Walter Wadlington, Adoption of Adults: A Family Law Anomaly, 54 COR-
NELL L. REV. 566, 579 (1969).
204 See Stevens, 168 N.Y.S. at 142.
205 Id. at 142-44.
206 Id. at 142.
207 Id. at 144.
208 Id.
209 In re Jones, 411 A.2d 910, 910-11 (R.I. 1980).
210 Id. at 910.
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two other children.211  The probate court denied the adoption petition
and the superior court affirmed this decision.212  Karen, who elected to
pursue the matter further despite having married someone other than
Duncan, argued that the adult adoption statute did not permit the adop-
tion to be denied as long as the parties complied with its procedural
requirements.213  Thus, she declared, the court was not allowed to con-
sider “in any manner, shape, or fashion her past adulterous association
with Duncan and its potentially incestuous impact.”214
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declared that the pro-
bate judge could exercise discretion where one adult seeks to adopt an-
other.215  It endorsed the comments of the lower court, which had
declared that
[i]t may be that public morality in our community has reached
a low ebb.  However, it is the opinion of the Court that it has
not yet descended to such a nadir as to require a probate or
superior court judge to implement an adoption between per-
sons whose relationship is essentially that of paramours.216
In effect, the appeals court added a morals provision to Rhode Island’s
adult adoption requirements.
ii. Gay or lesbian adopting parties
While a few courts have refused to allow one gay or lesbian partner
to adopt the other,217 most have concluded that such adoptions are
valid.218 In re Adoption of Robert Paul P.,219 a decision by the New
York Court of Appeals, reflects the minority view that gay and lesbian
adoptions are not valid.  In that case, the lower court refused to allow a
57-year-old man to adopt his 50-year-old partner.220  The admittedly gay
couple had lived together for more than 25 years.221  They sought to
formalize their relationship through adoption for social, financial and
emotional reasons.222  However, the lower court concluded that the par-
211 Id.
212 Id. at 911.
213 Id. at 910-11.
214 Id. at 911.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984).
218 See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Del. 1993); In re Adoption
of Patricia S., 976 A.2d 966, 972 (Me. 2009); Ex parte Libertini, 224 A.2d 443, 444 (Md.
1966); See also In re Adoption of Spado, 912 A.2d 578, 579 (Me. 2007).
219 In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d at 424-27.
220 Id. at 425.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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ties were attempting to use the adoption process to achieve objectives
that were more appropriately achieved by marriage, wills and business
contracts and, furthermore, that there was no parent-child relationship
between them.223  This decision was upheld by the Appellate
Division.224
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts.225
The appeals court began by citing the familiar maxim that adoption
should imitate nature.226  That is, adoption is intended to create a rela-
tionship between the adopter and adoptee that replicates that of parent
and child.227  Citing Stevens v. Halstead,228 the court declared that adop-
tion was not a “quasi-matrimonial vehicle” and could not be used as a
means of providing a legal sanction for an illicit sexual relationship,
whether it be heterosexual or homosexual.229  Furthermore, the court
opined that
any such sexual intimacy is utterly repugnant to the relation-
ship between child and parent in our society, and only a pa-
tently incongruous application of our adoption laws—wholly
inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a
parent-child relationship for the welfare of the child would per-
mit the employment of adoption as the legal formalization of
an adult relationship between sexual partners under the guise
of parent and child.230
Consequently, the court concluded that the adoption statute, as pres-
ently written, did not permit an adoption that was manifestly inconsis-
tent with a parent-child relationship.231
In contrast, courts in Maryland and Delaware have allowed same-
sex couples to adopt.  Ex Parte Libertini232 involved the proposed adop-
tion by an unmarried 56-year-old woman of a 35-year old unmarried
woman.233  Both women were members of the military.234  The purpose
of the adoption was to facilitate inheritance and promote “maternal
223 Id.
224 See In re Adoption of Pavlik, 469 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Table) (App. Div. 1983), aff’ d
sub nom In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984).
225 In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d at 425.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 168 N.Y.S. 142, 142 (App. Div. 1917).
229 In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d at 425.
230 Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted).
231 Id. at 427.
232 224 A.2d 443, 443 (Md. 1966).
233 Id. at 444.
234 Id.
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feeling.”235  However, the lower court summarily dismissed the petition,
contending that “to declare a person a legal child of an unmarried wo-
man is to declare her to be illegitimate.”236  For good measure, the
lower court added that the proposed adoption was “a perversion of the
entire adoptive process” and would serve no useful purpose.237
However, the appeals court determined that the state’s adoption
law did not require that an adoptive parent be married.238  Moreover, it
acknowledged that the law in Maryland permitted adult adoption for
purposes of inheritance and did not change the “social or domestic rela-
tionship of either party.”239  Consequently, the court rejected the lower
court’s assumption that the adoption of an adult by an unmarried adult
did not result in illegitimacy.240  Therefore, the court concluded that, in
the absence of any evidence of wrongdoing or improper motive, the
lower court improperly dismissed the parties’ petition.241
In In re Adoption of Swanson,242 Richard Sorrels sought to adopt
his companion of 17 years.243  At the time of the proposed adoption,
Sorrels was 66 years old and Swanson was 51.244  According to the peti-
tioners, the adoption was intended “formalize the close emotional rela-
tionship that had existed between them for many years and to facilitate
their estate planning.”245  Insofar as this latter goal was concerned, the
parties hoped that their adoption would frustrate claims against their
respective estates from remote family members.246  As in the Robert
Paul P. case, the lower court denied the petition because there was no
pre-existing parent-child relationship between the parties.247
The issue on appeal was whether a pre-existing family relationship
between the parties was required for an adult adoption.248  The court
began by pointing out that the Delaware adult adoption statute did not
expressly require parties to an adoption to prove that a family relation-
ship existed.249  In addition, it observed that the statute’s provisions for







241 Id. at 444-45.
242 623 A.2d 1095, 1095 (Del. 1993).





248 Id. at 1096-97.
249 Id. at 1097.
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nors.250  The latter contained provisions for the investigation and super-
vision of prospective placements, while the former did not.251  In
addition, the court noted other jurisdictions’ limited inquiries into the
parties’ motives in adult adoption cases and that most of them permitted
adoptions for the purpose of creating inheritance rights.252  The court
concluded by declaring that the Delaware statute also reflected a legisla-
tive intent to allow adoption for economic reasons and also to restrict
judicial inquiries into any ulterior motives the adopting parties might
have.253
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided Obergefell v.
Hodges, in which it upheld the validity of same sex marriages.254  This
ruling largely does away with the need for same sex couples to rely on
adult adoption as a substitute for marriage.
iii. Fraudulent motives
A few courts have disapproved of adult adoptions that were done
solely to affect inheritance rights.255  However, other states have al-
lowed adoptions for inheritance purposes to take place.  For example, in
Harper v. Martin,256 Vera Harper, who was suffering from terminal can-
cer, adopted 47-year-old Jim Harper for the sole purpose of making him
her heir.257  Upholding Jim’s right to inherit, the court distinguished be-
tween adopting in order to affect rights under a testamentary instrument
and adopting in order to make someone an heir under the laws of intes-
tate succession.258 In the former case, the adoption was intended to
thwart the intent of the testator and cheat the intended beneficiaries; in
the latter case, however, the decedent had no plan of disposition and,
therefore, suffered no injury.259
c. A Critique of Existing Adult Adoption Law
The foregoing discussion suggests that existing adult adoption laws
are often cluttered with baggage imported from earlier statutes centered
around the adoption of minors.  For example, requiring a pre-existing
parent-child relationship unnecessarily restricts the availability of adop-




253 Id. at 1099.
254 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
255 See Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Tr. Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Ky. 1967).
256 552 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
257 Id. at 692.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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quiring the consent of parents, or even spouses, is hard to justify when
the adoption does not impose a duty of support on the adoptive parent
or necessarily confer any legal rights on the adoptee.  Furthermore,
prohibiting one adult lover from adopting the other can hardly be justi-
fied on the theory that the parties are somehow parent and child.  While
these sorts of requirements, restrictions and prohibitions are appropri-
ate when the adoptee is a child, they serve no legitimate purpose when
the parties are competent adults.
V. ADULT ADOPTION AND INTESTACY
Adult adoptions are frequently used as a means of transferring
property to another at death.  As such, adoption is an appropriate form
of will substitute as far as the parties to the adoption are concerned.
However, it is more troublesome when used to effectuate a transfer of
property from a third party to the adoptee.  This section examines vari-
ous aspects of adoption and intestacy.  The discussion starts with the
right of an adopted child to inherit from adoptive parents and other
members of the adoptive family.  The next issue involves the right of an
adopted child to inherit under the laws of descent and distribution from
biological parents and other biological family members.  As there are
relatively few reported cases on this issue involving adult adoptions, dis-
cussion will initially focus on the adoption of minors.
A. The Right of Adopted Children to Inherit from Members of
Their Adoptive Family
1. The Right of Adopted Children to Inherit from Their Adoptive
Parents
Although some of the earlier decisions declared that an adopted
child’s right to inherit from his or her adoptive parents was wholly con-
tractual in nature,260 most courts have since concluded that an adopted
child’s inheritance rights derives from the state’s adoption statute.261
They have also found that virtually all adoption statutes either expressly
or impliedly allow adopted children to inherit from their adoptive par-
ents.262  A California decision, In re Newman’s Estate, illustrates this
260 See Merritt v. Morton, 136 S.W. 133, 134 (Ky. 1911); In re Eddins’ Estate, 279
N.W. 244, 245 (S.D. 1938).
261 See In re Grinnell’s Estate, 220 N.W. 583, 585 (Neb. 1928).
262 See, e.g., In re Williams’ Estate, 36 P. 407, 410 (Cal. 1894); In re Newman’s Estate,
16 P. 887, 888-89 (Cal. 1888); Glos v. Sankey, 36 N.E. 628, 634 (Ill. 1893); Atchison v.
Atchison’s Ex’rs, 12 S.W. 942, 943 (Ky. 1890); Power v. Hafley, 4 S.W. 683, 684 (Ky.
1887); Buckley v. Frazier, 27 N.E. 768, 769 (Mass. 1891); In re Grinnell’s Estate, 220 N.W.
at 585; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 195 N.Y.S. 605, 606 (App. Div. 1922), aff’ d 142 N.E. 277
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principle nicely.263  Ruling that an adopted child was entitled to inherit
from his adoptive parents, the court reviewed the adoption provisions of
the California Civil Code, sections 227 and 228, as well as the state’s
statute on descent and distribution, section 1386.264  First, the court ob-
served that section 227 stated that the adoption order must declare that
the adopted child “shall thenceforth be regarded and treated in all re-
spects as the child of the person adopting.”265  Furthermore, section 228
provided that once the adoption proceeding was completed, the parties
“shall sustain towards each other the legal relation of parent and child,
and have all the rights, and be subject to all the duties of that rela-
tion.”266  The court concluded that the language of these provisions was
sufficiently “general and comprehensive” to include the right to inherit
from the adoptive parent in the same manner as a natural child.267
2. The Right of Adopted Children to Inherit from the Ancestors
of Their Adoptive Parents
There was a split of authority, particularly among the older cases, as
to whether an adopted child can inherit from adoptive grandparents or
other ancestors.  In the absence of express statutory language, courts
typically relied on a number of rationales to deny adoptees the right to
inherit.268  For example, it was said that the adoption process was con-
tractual in nature.269  According to this theory, the contracting parties
should not be able to affect the rights of those who were not parties to
the contract.270  Another rationale emphasized that descent and distri-
bution were historically restricted to the decedent’s blood line.271  How-
(N.Y. 1923); In re Powell’s Estate, 183 N.Y.S. 939, 940 (Sur. Ct. Oneida Cty. 1920); Mau-
rer v. Becker, 271 N.E.2d 255, 258 (Ohio 1971).
263 16 P. 887, 888 (Cal. 1888).
264 Id.
265 Id. (emphasis added).
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See In re Sunderland, 13 N.W. 655, 656 (Iowa 1882); Merritt v. Morton, 136 S.W.
133, 133-34 (Ky. 1911); Meader v. Archer, 23 A. 521, 521 (N.H. 1889); In re Hayes’ Es-
tate, 86 P.2d 424, 436 (Or. 1939); In re Eddins’ Estate, 279 N.W. 244, 245 (S.D. 1938); In
re Harrington’s Estate, 85 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1938).  Note, some of the cases cited for
historical background in this article have been subsequently overruled either completely
or in part, but the historical treatment of the issues is still relevant to this discussion.
269 See Fred L. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28
WASH. U. L. Q. 221, 234-35 (1943).
270 See In re Eddins’ Estate, 279 N.W. 244, 245 (S.D. 1938).
271 See Rein, supra note 31 at 713.
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ever, nowadays, most courts have allowed adopted children to inherit
from ancestors of their adoptive parents.272
3. The Right of Adopted Children to Inherit from Collateral
Relatives of Their Adoptive Parents
There is also a split of authority over whether adopted children can
inherit from the collateral relatives of their adoptive parents.  Many of
the older cases refused to recognize such inheritance rights;273 however
the trend now seems to be moving in the direction of allowing adopted
children to inherit.274  This trend is based on the notion that an adopted
child, like the natural offspring of his biological parents, not only ac-
quires new parents, but may also acquire new siblings, grandparents,
aunts, uncles or cousins.275
4. The Right of Adopted Children to Inherit from Their
Biological Parents
Up until the second half of the twentieth century, most courts per-
mitted adopted children to inherit from and through their biological
parents.276  The courts of that period expressed various rationales in
support of this position.  One rationale was that statutes of descent and
distribution based inheritance rights almost exclusively on consanguin-
272 See In re Estate of Darling, 159 P. 606, 608-09 (Cal. 1916); Riley v. Day, 129 P. 524
(Kan. 1913); In re Taylor’s Estate, 285 N.W 538, 541 (Neb. 1939).
273 See Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill. 26, 35-36 (1881); Batcheller-Durkee v. Batch-
eller, 97 A. 378, 380 (R.I. 1916).
274 See McClure v. Noble, 602 So. 2d 377, 378 (Ala. 1992); In re Estate of Carlton,
348 So. 2d 896, 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); see also Anne Wiseman French, When
Blood Isn’t Thicker Than Water: The Inheritance Rights of Adopted-out Children in New
York, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1034-35 (1988).
275 See Rein, supra note 31 at 721-22.
276 See, e.g., In re Moore’s Estate, 47 P.2d 533, 535 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935); In re
Wilson’s Estate, 33 P.2d 969, 970 (Colo. 1934); In re Estate of Levy, 141 So. 2d 803, 805
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Sears v. Minchew, 93 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956);
In re Tilliski’s Estate, 56 N.E.2d 481, 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944); Holmes v. Curl, 178 N.W.
406, 408 (Iowa 1920); Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532, 534 (1879); In re Bartram’s Estate,
198 P. 192, 193 (Kan. 1921); Dreyer v. Schrick, 185 P. 30, 33 (Kan. 1919); Roberts v.
Roberts, 199 N.W. 581, 581 (Minn. 1924); In re Estate of Jones, 687 So. 2d 1171, 1178
(Miss. 1996); Alack v. Phelps, 230 So. 2d 789, 793 (Miss. 1970); Sledge v. Floyd, 104 So.
163, 164-65 (Miss. 1925); In re Kay’s Estate, 260 P.2d 391, 395 (Mont. 1953); In re Estate
of Wulf, 167 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Neb. 1969); Nickell v. Gall, 229 A.2d 511, 513 (N.J. 1967);
Estate of Ballantine v. Close, 81 N.W.2d 259, 261-62 (N.D. 1957); Sorenson v. Churchill,
212 N.W. 488, 489 (N.D. 1927); Stark v. Watson, 359 P.2d 191, 194 (Okla. 1961); In re
Benner’s Estate, 166 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1946); In re Roderick’s Estate, 291 P. 325, 327
(Wash. 1930).
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ity.277  For example, in In re Estate of Wulf, an adopted child sought to
inherit from the estate of her biological father.278  Upholding the lower
court’s decision that the adopted child could inherit, the appellate court
emphasized the importance of the bloodline in descent and
distribution.279
Another justification of allowing an adopted child to inherit was
based on the notion that the adoption process should not strip the child
of his natural inheritance rights when the child was unable to withhold
his consent.280  However, the most popular approach to the issue of in-
heritance rights relied on principles of statutory construction.  Essen-
tially, courts that employed this approach concluded that adoption
statutes should be liberally construed insofar as they conferred rights on
the adopted child, but should not be interpreted to take away existing
rights unless the legislative intent to do so was clear and explicit.281  This
principle is illustrated by Estate of Levy, where the court declared that
the state’s adoption statute “does not attempt to take away an adoptee’s
preexisting right of inheritance from his natural parents or from his nat-
ural kindred.  It only limits the right of the natural parents to inherit
from the adopted child.  No other limitation appears in the statute.”282
However, an interesting issue arises in cases where an adopted child
is also related by blood to the decedent, usually an ancestor such as a
grandparent.  Assuming that the adoptive child can directly inherit from
his adoptive parent by virtue of the adoption statute, can he take an
additional share under the statute of descent and distribution based on
the blood relationship between the adopted child and the decedent?
Some jurisdictions have accepted this “dual inheritance” theory,283 but
others have rejected it because it treated adopted children differently
277 See In re Wilson’s Estate, 33 P.2d at 969-70; In re Levy, 141 So. 2d at 804; Alack,
230 So. 2d at 792-93; In re Wulf, 167 N.W.2d at 182; Estate of Ballantine, 81 N.W.2d at
262; Sorenson, 212 N.W. at 489.
278 See In re Wulf, 167 N.W.2d at 182.  The claimant, Anne Marie, was adopted as a
child by her father’s sister and husband.  During his lifetime, Anne Marie stayed in close
contact with her biological father, Fred Wulf. Id.
279 Id.
280 See, e.g., In re Wilson’s Estate, 33 P.2d at 971; In re Bartram’s Estate, 198 P. at 193;
Alack, 230 So. 2d at 792; Estate of Ballantine, 81 N.W.2d at 263; Sorenson, 212 N.W. at
489; Stark, 359 P.2d at 195.
281 See Wagner, 50 Iowa at 534; In re Bartram’s Estate, 198 P. at 193; Dreyer, 185 P. at
33; Roberts, 199 N.W. at 581; Sledge, 104 So. at 165; Stark, 359 P.2d at 194; In re Benner’s
Estate, 166 P.2d at 259 ; In re Roderick’s Estate, 291 P. at 327.
282 See In re Estate of Levy, 141 So. 2d. 803, 805-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
283 See In re Wilson’s Estate, 33 P.2d 969, 971 (Colo. 1934); Wagner v. Varner, 50
Iowa 532, 532 (1879); In re Bartram’s Estate, 198 P. 192, 193 (Kan. 1921); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 990 So. 2d 807, 812-13 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); In re Benner’s Estate, 166 P.2d 257,
259 (Utah 1946).
F15/W16] THE RIGHT OF ADOPTEES TO INHERIT 271
than natural children of the adoptive parents.284  The modern trend is to
deny an adopted child to right to inherit from his or her biological par-
ents.285  Today, adoption statutes seek to promote the best interests of
the child by totally transferring the child to a new family with a “fresh
start” as a full-fledged member of the adoptive family.286  When a child
is adopted, the rights of his or her biological parents are terminated, and
the child receives a new birth certificate in the name of the adoptive
family.287
5. The Right of Adopted Children to Inherit from Their
Biological Relatives
With shift in emphasis from bloodlines to the integration of the
adopted child into the adoptive family, it is not surprising that recent
statutes, and the cases interpreting them, have not allowed adopted chil-
dren to inherit through representation from their biological relatives.288
Hall v. Vallandingham provides a good illustration of this approach.289
In that case, Earl Vallandingham died in 1956, survived by his spouse
and four children.290  The widow remarried two years later and her new
husband, Jim Kilgore, adopted the children.291  In 1983, Earl’s brother,
William, died intestate, survived by a number of siblings and the chil-
dren of siblings who had predeceased him.292  Earl’s children appealed
the trial court’s ruling that their adoption by Kilgore precluded them
from receiving a share of William’s estate.293  The court observed that at
the time of their adoption, the applicable statute clearly gave Earl’s chil-
dren the right to inherit from his relatives.294  However, in 1963, the
284 See Billings v. Head, 111 N.E. 177, 177 (Ind. 1916); Delano v. Bruerton, 20 N.E.
308, 309 (Mass. 1889); Young v. Bridges, 165 A. 272, 275-76 (N.H. 1933); Morgan v. Reel,
62 A. 253, 256-57 (Pa. 1905).
285 See In re Garay, 518 N.Y.S.2d 723, 728-29 (Sur. Ct. Kings Cty. 1987); see also N.
Danette Parkins, Comment, Inheritance Rights Affected by Adoption: The Need for Statu-
tory Reform, 26 IDAHO L. REV. 529, 536 (1989-90).
286 See Rein, supra note 31, at 713; Messler, supra note 3, at 1046.
287 See Peter T. Wendel, The Succession Rights of Adopted Adults: Trying to Fit a
Square Peg Into a Round Hole, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815, 834 (2010).
288 See, e.g., In re Estate of Calhoun, 282 P.2d 880, 881 (Cal. 1955) (brother); In re
Estate of McQuesten, 578 A.2d 335, 338-39 (N.H. 1990) (grandmother); Hall v. Val-
landingham, 540 A.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Md. 1988) (uncle); In re Estate of Carlson, 457
N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (cousins); but see In re Harrington’s Estate, 85
P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1938); In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Wash. 1973)
(grandfather).
289 540 A.2d 1162 (Md. 1988).
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legislature enacted a new statute which provided that adopted children
would lose all rights of inheritance from their parents, as well as from
their collateral and lineal relatives.295  According to the court, the cur-
rent statute, which replaced the 1963 act, retained this prohibition
against inheritance.296  This prohibition served two purposes:  First, it
removed the superior status that adoptive children would have if they
were allowed to inherit from both their biological and their adoptive
families.297 Second, the court declared that adoption should be treated
as a “rebirth” into a new relationship, which results in a “clean-cut sev-
erance of the natural bloodline.”298  Accordingly, the Maryland appel-
late court affirmed the lower court’s judgment.299
B. The Right of Third Parties to Inherit from or through Adoptees
If adopted children are allowed to inherit from their adoptive par-
ents and other relatives, should descendants of these adopted children
possess similar rights of inheritance?  Until recently, the weight of au-
thority favored inheritance rights in such cases.300  Some courts also al-
lowed descendants of adopted children to inherit from ancestors and
collateral relatives of their adoptive parents.301  While the majority of
decisions now allow adoptive parents to inherit from their adoptive chil-
dren,302 there is a split of authority insofar as the inheritance rights of
relatives of the adoptive parents are concerned.303  Finally, although
earlier cases sometimes permitted biological parents or other relatives
295 Id.
296 Id. at 1164-65.
297 Id.at 1164.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 1165.
300 See Power v. Hafley, 4 S.W. 683, 684-85 (Ky. 1887); In re Cook’s Estate, 79 N.E.
991, 993 (N.Y. 1907); In re Estate of Seaman, 583 N.E.2d 294, 297 (N.Y. 1991); In re
Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118, 119 (S.D. 1978).
301 See Brooks Bank & Tr. Co. v. Rorabacher, 171 A. 655, 658 (Conn. 1934); Wagner
v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532, 534 (1879); Atchison v. Atchison’s Ex’rs, 12 S.W. 942, 943 (Ky.
1890); Batchelder v. Walworth, 82 A. 7, 13 (Vt. 1912).
302 See Wright v. Wysowatcky, 363 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Colo. 1961); but see In re Job-
son’s Estate, 128 P. 938, 940 (Cal. 1912); Burger v. Frakes, 25 N.W. 735, 735 (Iowa 1885);
Mancino v. Smith, 201 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Ohio Prob. Ct. Cuyahoga Cty. 1964); Hood v.
Hatfield, 383 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Or. 1963); Hole v. Robbins, 10 N.W. 617, 619 (Wis. 1881).
303 See Phelan v. Conron, 81 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Mass. 1948) (recognizing the right to
inherit); Willson v. Carmichael, 665 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (same); In re
Estate of Neil, 191 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Neb. 1971) (same); In re Estate of Gillin, 773 A.2d
270, 271(Vt. 2001) (same); In re Loakes’ Estate, 32 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Mich. 1948) (same);
Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655, 658-59 (1880) (rejecting the right to inherit); In re
Frazier’s Estate, 177 P.2d 254, 264 (Or. 1947) (same); In re Edwards, 273 N.W.2d at 119
(same).
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to inherit from or through adopted children,304 the weight of authority
has now shifted toward the denial of such inheritance rights.305
C. Inheritance Rights of Adult Adoptees
Although almost all states have enacted statutes to permit adult
adoption, only a few adoption statutes specifically address the issue of
adult adoption and intestate succession.306  The rest do not distinguish
between the adoption of adults and minors but instead leave the deter-
mination of inheritance rights for adult adoptees to the courts.307  How-
ever, the Uniform Probate Code provides some guidance.  Section 2-118
states that “a parent-child relationship exists between an adoptee and
the adoptee’s adoptive parent or parents.”308  Section 2-115 defines
“adoptee” broadly as “an individual who has been adopted” without
distinguishing between adults and minors.309  This is further clarified by
a comment to section 2-115 which declares that the term “adoptee is not
limited to an individual who is adopted as a minor but includes an indi-
vidual who is adopted as an adult.”310  Finally, according to section 2-
116, if there is a parent-child relationship, “the parent is a parent of the
child and the child is a child of the parent for the purpose of intestate
succession.”311  This suggests that an adult adoptee not only can inherit
from his or her adoptive parents but may inherit through them as well
by representation.312
In the absence of explicit statutory guidance, courts tend to treat
adult adoptees the same as minors as far as inheritance rights are con-
cerned.313  Thus, the adopted adult may inherit from his or her adopted
parents in the same manner as an adopted minor child.  This approach is
304 See Baker v. Clowser, 138 N.W. 837, 840 (Iowa 1912); Dodson v. Ward, 240 P.
991, 994 (N.M. 1925).
305 See Alexander v. Lamar, 3 S.E.2d 656, 658-59 (Ga. 1939); Swick v. Coleman, 75
N.E. 807, 808-09 (Ill. 1905); Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274, 282 (1885); In re Estate of
Mills, 374 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 1985); In re Yates’ Estate, 196 P. 1077, 1077 (Kan.
1921); Shepherd v. Murphy, 61 S.W.2d 746, 748-49 (Mo. 1933); In re Enyart’s Estate, 218
N.W. 89, 91-92 (Neb. 1928); In re Fodor, 117 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (Sur. Ct. Bronx Cty.
1952); In re Hollstein’s Estate, 295 N.Y.S. 598, 599 (App. Div. 1937); Ryan v. Sexton, 181
N.Y.S. 10, 11-12 (App. Div. 1920); In re Havsgord’s Estate, 147 N.W. 378, 380 (S.D.
1014); Kummer v. Donak, 715 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Va. 2011); In re Estate of Kirkpatrick, 77 P.3d
404, 409 (Wyo. 2003); see also Ratliff, supra note 6, at 1781.
306 See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-6 cmt. (2011); IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(d) (2011).
307 See Ratliff, supra note 6, at 1792.
308 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
309 Id. § 2-115(1).
310 Id. § 2-115 cmt, 8.
311 Id. § 2-116.
312 See Ratliff, supra note 6, at 1791.
313 Id. at 1781.
274 ACTEC LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:241
exemplified by Tinney v. Tinney.314  In 1990, Ruth Tinney, who was 84
years old at the time, adopted Kevin Koellisch, then 38 years old, in an
adult adoption proceeding.315  She died intestate in 1995, survived by
Kevin and her biological son, Donald.316  Kevin claimed one-half of
Ruth’s estate and Donald sought a declaratory judgment, contending
that, unlike minors, adult adoptees could not inherit from their adoptive
parents.317  The lower court held in Kevin’s favor and Donald ap-
pealed.318  Reviewing various statutes, the appellate court concluded
that they were “intended to integrate adopted children into family units
and thus promote the public interest in the preservation of the family”
and as such, should be “liberally construed in favor of the adopted
child.”319  Finally, while acknowledging that the legislature had distin-
guished between minors and adults as far as adoption requirements
were concerned, it made no distinction between their inheritance
rights.320
An early case, First National Bank of St. Petersburg v. Mott, pro-
vides an exception to this principle.321  The case involved a dispute be-
tween an adopted child and the widow of her adopted father and her
two minor children.322  The decedent, Samuel E. Doan, and his wife
adopted Mae Mott, a married woman, who had lived with them in Con-
necticut as a member of their family.323  Mae argued that she should
inherit a share of Samuel’s estate as if she were his natural daughter.324
The lower court upheld Mae’s claim and Samuel’s widow and children
appealed.325  The Florida Supreme Court noted that the state’s adoption
statute provided that “[a]ny child adopted by any person under the pro-
visions of this law shall be declared the child and heir-at-law of the per-
son applying for his adoption.”326  However, the court declared that the
word “child” ordinarily meant a minor, not an adult.327  Therefore, it
concluded that Mae, as an adult adoptee, was not entitled to inherit
from her adoptive parent.328
314 799 A.2d 235 (R.I. 2002).
315 Id. at 235.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 236.
319 Id. at 237.
320 Id.
321 133 So. 78 (Fla. 1931).





327 Id. at 79.
328 Id.
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Most states also allow the issue of an adopted child to inherit from
their adoptive parents as well.329 Adams v. Slater330 is illustrative of this
view.  In 1949, Frances and Anna Belle Rinard, a married couple,
adopted Winona Jane Whitaker, a 26-year-old niece of Anna Belle.331
Winona Jane married Richard Strasser a few months later and gave
birth to a daughter, Dianna Strausser, in 1950.332  Winona Jane died in
1956, survived by her husband, her daughter and her adoptive
mother.333  In 1958, Anna Belle died intestate, survived by Dianna and
fifteen brothers, sisters and other collateral relatives.334 Dianna claimed
to be her adoptive grandmother’s sole heir, a claim that was disputed by
Anna Belle’s blood relatives.335  The lower court ruled in favor of
Dianna.336
To support their claim, Anna Belle’s relatives contended that the
revised version of the state probate code limited the inheritance rights
of adopted adults.337  The court in Scott v. Scott338 had concluded that
section 6-208(a) of the revised probate code, which declared that “a
child legally adopted during his minority . . . shall cease to be treated as
the child of his natural parents . . . for purposes of intestate succession
. . . ”339 implicitly repealed a provision of the 1946 code which allowed
an adopted child to inherit from his or her natural parent.340  However,
the court in Adams held that section 6-208(b) had not repealed an ear-
lier provision that declared that an adopted adult would be treated as
the child of his natural parents for purposes of intestate succession, but
added the words “except that he shall in addition be entitled to inherit
as a child from the adopting parent or parents.”341  In other words, the
revised probate code provided that all adopted children could inherit
from their adopted parents, but adopted adults could also inherit
through their adopted parents.342
329 See In re Matzke’s Estate, 26 N.W.2d 659, 661 (Wis. 1947).
330 175 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961).




335 Id. Anna Belle’s relatives argued that Dianna could only claim a share of the
estate as a grandniece of Anna Belle, being the natural granddaughter of Anna Belle’s
deceased sister, and not as her granddaughter. Id.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 150 N.E.2d 740, 742-43 (Ind. 1958).
339 Id. at 741.
340 Adams v. Slater, 175 N.E.2d  706, 707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961).
341 Id. at 708.
342 Id.
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The court offered the following explanation for this curious inter-
pretation of the revised probate code:  When a married couple adopts
an adult, particularly when the adoptee’s natural parents are dead, “they
might take pride in having grandchildren and knowing that the fruits of
their own labors do not go unattended.”343  Consequently, the court de-
clared that “it has no right to allow collateral relatives to disturb either
the relationship of the adoptive parent to the adopted child or the rela-
tionship of the adoptive parent to the adopted child’s natural child who,
in both a legal and moral sense, should retain all the rights of a natural
grandchild.”344 Therefore, it affirmed the lower court’s holding that Di-
anna was entitled to claim Anna Belle’s entire estate as her
grandchild.345
In In re Estate of Brittin,346 an Illinois appellate court considered
whether children of an adult adopted child who were alive at the time of
the adoption should be considered to be grandchildren of the adoptive
parents.  When Stephen Brittin married Estelle, she had a child, Wil-
liam, who was three years old at the time of his mother’s marriage.347
The couple had a daughter of their own, Mary Buckman.348  Shortly af-
ter Estelle died in 1975, Stephen adopted William, who was then 46
years old and the father of five children.349  William died in 1979, sur-
vived by his children and Stephen died intestate in 1993, survived by
daughter, Mary.350  After Stephen’s death, William’s children claimed a
share of his estate.351  However, Mary, who had been appointed as ad-
ministrator of the estate, opposed the children’s claim.352
Mary acknowledged that William, as an adopted child, would have
been entitled to one-half of Stephen’s estate if he had survived.353  How-
ever, she argued that since William’s children were alive at the time of
his adoption, they could not be considered descendants of an “adopted
child” as specified in the state’s probate code.354  The lower court, how-
ever, ruled that William’s children could take his share of the estate by
representation.355  On appeal, the lower court’s decision was upheld.356
343 Id. at 709.
344 Id. at 710-11.
345 Id. at 711.
346 664 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).




351 Id. at 689.
352 Id. at 688-89.
353 Id. at 689.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 688.
356 Id. at 691.
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The court reasoned that if the probate code treated an adopted child as
a descendant of the adoptive parent, the children of the adopted child
must also be descendants and occupied the status of grandchildren.357
Hence, it did not matter whether they were alive at the time of the
adoption or were born afterwards.358
In some cases, an adult adoption may have the effect of disinherit-
ing members of the adoptee’s biological family even though the adop-
tion was not intended to sever the adoptee’s relationship with his or her
existing family.  For example, in Kummer v. Donak,359 Justine Critzer
died intestate in 2006 without a surviving spouse, children, parents or
siblings and it appeared that her only heirs were distant cousins.360
However, three nieces and nephews, the children of Justine’s sister,
Mary Frances Kummer, subsequently claimed the estate as Justine’s
closest surviving relatives.361  The issue was further muddled by the dis-
covery that Mary Frances had been adopted in 1981 at the age of 53 by
her aunt by marriage, Arietta Kaleta.362  At that point, the administra-
tor of Justine’s estate petitioned the circuit court for a ruling on the
effect the adoption would have on the inheritance rights of the Kummer
children.363  The court concluded that the adoption of Mary Frances sev-
ered her right to inherit from Justine and severed the right of her chil-
dren to inherit as well.364
On appeal, the Kummer children argued that their mother’s adop-
tion should not sever their right to inherit from their aunt.365  The appel-
late court pointed out that section 64.1-5.1 of the Virginia Code
provided that a relationship of parent and child must be established in
order for a person to take the share of another by representation.366
Furthermore, in order to inherit as the descendants of Justine’s sister,
the Kummer children had to show that Justine and Mary Frances were
legally sisters for purposes of intestate succession.367  According to the
court, “Applying the unambiguous language of Code § 64.1-5.1, Mrs.
[Mary Frances] Kummer became the child of her adopting parent and
no longer was the child of her biological parents.  Consequently, Critzer
357 Id.
358 Id.
359 715 S.E.2d 7, 8 (Va. 2011).





365 Id. at 9.
366 Id.
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and Mrs. Kummer, while biologically sisters, were not legally sisters for
purposes of intestate succession under Code § 64.1-1.”368
The court also declared that a provision of the state’s adoption stat-
ute, section 63.2-1215, provided that an adopted child becomes the child
of the adopting parent and is thereby placed on an equal footing with
other members of her adoptive family.369  In the court’s view, “[t]his
provision divested Mrs. Kummer’s biological parents of their legal rights
with respect to Mrs. Kummer.  Such divestiture extends to collateral rel-
atives whose interest derives through the parents, which includes
Crtizer.”370
In Estate of Mills, the Iowa Supreme Court engaged in similar rea-
soning to deny the biological parent of an adult adoptee the right to
inherit her estate.371  Inez Mills, the daughter of Earl and Lydia Mills,
went to live with her mother’s half-brother, Gustav Possehl when she
was 11 or 12 years old.372  Gustav adopted Inez when she was 25 years
old.373  Gustav died in 1970 and Inez died intestate in 1983.374 Inez sur-
vived Earl, Lydia and her sister, Mae, but she was survived by her sib-
lings, Dale, Pauline and Betty, as well as by Darwin, a son of Mae.375
Both Inez’s biological relatives and Gustav’s heirs claimed her estate.376
The lower court ruled in favor of Gustav’s heirs, relying on a provision
of the adoption statute that declared that “a lawful adoption extin-
guishes the right of intestate succession of a natural parent from and
through the parent’s natural born child who is adopted.”377  On appeal,
Inez’s relatives contended that this provision should not apply to single-
parent adoptions.378  The appellate court acknowledged that the statute
had once permitted inheritance through the biological parents of an
adopted adult, but it observed that this provision had been repealed.379
Consequently, it affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of Gustav’s
heirs.380
To summarize, an adult adoptee can usually inherit from and
through his or her adoptive parents.  On the other hand, the right to
368 Id.
369 Id. at 10.
370 Id.
371 In re Estate of Mills, 374 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1985).
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inherit from the adoptee’s biological family may be lost, regardless of
the expectations of the parties involved.  This arguably makes little
sense.  Since an adult adoption does not involve a fresh start as it does in
the case of children, it is questionable whether an adult adoptee should
be allowed to inherit from ancestors or collateral members of the adop-
tive parent’s family.  Even if adult adoption is viewed as a mechanism
for the post-mortem transfer of property from one adoptive party to the
other, there is no reason to extend the right to inheritance to third par-
ties.  At the same time, since most adult adoptees retain close ties with
their biological families, their right to inherit under a state’s intestacy
law should not be cut off by an adoption.
VI. CLASS GIFTS IN WILLS AND TRUSTS
Part V was concerned with the right of adopted persons to inherit
from their adoptive parents and other family members who die intes-
tate.  In such cases, when courts have to decide questions about an
adoptee’s right to inherit, they must determine legislative intent as em-
bodied in adoption laws and statutes of descent and distribution.  In
contrast, when a will or trust is involved, a court must ascertain the set-
tlor’s or testator’s intent to determine whether an adult adoptee should
be included within a designated class of beneficiaries such as children,
issue, descendants, heirs or next of kin.381  This process involves an ex-
amination of “the words of the instrument and, if necessary, the scheme
of distribution, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will
[or trust] and other facts bearing on the question [of intent].”382  Of
course, determining a testator’s intent is not difficult when it is clearly
expressed.  However, when the language of a will or trust is ambiguous,
or silent on this issue, the court must rely on statutory directives, canons
of construction or other interpretive tools.
381 See Estate of Pittman v. Tuffree, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 529 (Ct. App. 1980); In re Tr.
Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 459 (Colo. App. 1991); Munie v. Gruenewald, 124 N.E.
605, 606 (Ill. 1919); Paloutzian v. Taggart, 931 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Elli-
ott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Iowa 1981); Lockwood v. Adamson, 566 N.E.2d
96, 98 (Mass. 1991); In re Trs. of Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Minn. 1977); Com-
merce Tr. Co. v. Weed, 318 S.W.2d 289, 294 (Mo. 1958); In re Estate of Sykes, 383 A.2d
920, 921 (Pa. 1978); In re Hamilton’s Estate, 312 A.2d 373, 374 (Pa. 1973); Security Nat’l
Bank & Tr. Co. v. William, 153 S.E.2d 114, 118 (W. Va. 1967).
382 See In re Sykes, 383 A.2d at 921; see also Mooney v. Tolles, 149 A. 515, 518 (Conn.
1930); Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Iowa 1981); In re Estate of Wolf, 236
A.2d 166, 169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); In re Estate of Kauffman, 506 A.2d 951,
952-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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A. Statutes, Presumptions and Rules of Construction
In a few states, statutes identify the inheritance rights of adult
adoptees in general terms only.  For example, Minnesota’s adult adop-
tion statute declares that the adoption decree establishes a parent-child
relationship between the parties, “including the right to inherit.”383  The
West Virginia adoption statute also makes a general reference to the
right to inherit.384 However, the Texas adoption statute is more specific,
providing that the adopted adult “is entitled to inherit from and through
the adopted adult’s adoptive parents as though the adopted adult were
the biological child of the adoptive parents.”385  In addition, the statute
states that “[t]he adopted adult retains the right to inherit from the
adult’s biological parents,” but denies the biological parents the right to
inherit from or through the adopted adult.386  Finally, a Colorado adop-
tion statute permits an adult to enter into an agreement with another
adult to determine inheritance rights.387  Although these statutes prima-
rily apply to intestacy, courts rely on them in other cases as well.  In
addition, many other statutes declare that adoptees have the same rights
and privileges as natural children without mentioning inheritance
specifically.388
In the absence of express statutory guidance, courts often rely on
presumptions to decide whether a testator intended an adoptee to take a
share of a class gift.  For example, in the past, many states recognized a
“stranger to the adoption” rule that presumed that relatives of the adop-
tive parent, who were not parties to the adoption, would not want an
adoptee to take a share of their estate as beneficiaries of a class gift
under a will or a trust.389  This presumption could only be overcome by
383 See MINN. STAT. § 259.241(c) (2016).
384 See W. VA. CODE § 48-22-801 (2016).
385 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.507(b) (2015).
386 See Id. § 162.507(c).
387 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-1-101(2) (2016).
388 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-8101(B) (2016); CAL. FAM. CODE § 9305
(West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-211 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 954 (2016);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-21(a) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.390 (West 2016); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 63-9-1120 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 5-102 (2016);WIS. STAT.
§ 882.04 (2016).
389 See Abramovic v. Brunken, 94 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Ct. App. 1971); Conn.Bank &
Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Conn. 1972); Mooney v. Tolles, 149 A. 515 (Ct.
1930); Comer v. Comer, 23 S.E.2d 420, 425  (Ga. 1942); Paloutzian v. Taggart, 931 N.E.2d
921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 81-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001);
Mesecher v. Leir, 43 N.W.2d 149, 151-52 (Iowa 1950); Savells v. Brown’s Guardian, 218
S.W. 462, 462-63 (Ky. 1920); Fiduciary Tr. Co. v. Silsbee, 187 A.2d 396, 400 (Me. 1963); In
re Tr. of Vander Poel, 933 A.2d 628, 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); In re Leask, 90
N.E. 652, 654 (N.Y. 1910); N.Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N.E. 311, 314-15 (N.Y.
1899); 3d Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Davidson, 105 N.E.2d 573, 579 (Ohio 1952); Cent. Tr.
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language in the instrument that manifested a clear intent to include
adoptees in the class gift.  The stranger to the adoption principle was
based on a number of assumptions.  First of all, it assumed that mem-
bers of the adoptive family, other than the adoptive parents, would pre-
fer to keep their property within the family bloodline.390  Second, the
adoptive parent should not be able to impose kinship status on unwilling
family members who were not parties to the adoption.391  Finally, an
adoptive parent should not be able to thwart a testator’s distributive
scheme by adopting another person without his or her knowledge or
consent.392
In re Woodcock393 provides a good illustration of how this pre-
sumption operated in the past.  In 1890, Ann Johnson executed a will
that left the balance of her estate to her daughter, Mary.394  If Mary died
without children, the property was to go in equal shares to three of
Ann’s other children, Arabella, Horatio and Charles.395  Finally, if any
of the three children were to die before Mary, his or her children would
divide their parent’s share.396  Amy died in 1891 and Mary died in 1906,
apparently without surviving children.397  Meanwhile, Horatio died in
1896.398  He did not have any natural children, but had adopted a child,
Ella, in 1882.399  At Mary’s death, Ella claimed Horatio’s share of the
estate, arguing that she was his “child” for purposes of taking under the
provisions of Ann’s will.400  However, the probate court rejected Ella’s
claim.401
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that
an adopted child can take under the will of an adoptive parent who de-
vises property to a child or children since “he is under obligation in
Co. v. Hart, 80 N.E.2d 920, 925 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); In re Hayes’ Estate, 86 P.2d 424,
435-36 (Or. 1939); In re Ray Ellison Grandchildren Tr., 261 S.W.3d 111, 122 (Tex. App.
2008); In re Harrington’s Estate, 85 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1938).
390 See Nunnally v. Tr. Co. Bank, 261 S.E.2d 621, 624 (Ga. 1979); Comer, 23 S.E.2d at
425; Fiduciary Tr. Co., 187 A.2d at 400; In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 396 (N.J. 1969);
N.Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co,. 55 N.E. at 314; In re Cave’s Estate, 192 A. 460, 461 (Pa. 1937).
391 See In re Estate of Uihlein, 68 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Wis. 1955).
392 See In re Estate of Comly, 218 A.2d 175, 178 (Gloucester Cty. Ct. Prob. Div.
1966).
393 68 A. 821 (Me. 1907).
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morals, if not in law, to make provision for such child.”402  However, the
court concluded that result should not apply to a will made by someone
else.403 According to the court:
When in a will provision is made for a “child or children” of
some other person than the testator, an adopted child is not
included, unless other language in the will makes it clear that
he was intended to be included, which is not the case here.  In
making a devise over from his own children to their “child or
children,” there is a presumption that the testator intended
“child or children” of his own blood, and did not intend his
estate to go to a stranger to his blood.404
The court went on to observe that, although Ella was a child of Horatio
by virtue of the adoption, she was not the grandchild of Horatio’s
mother, the testator, who “was under no sort of obligation, moral or
family, to make any provision for her.”405  Finding no evidence in the
will of a contrary intent, the court concluded that Ann intended Hora-
tio’s share “to go out of the blood” to an adopted child.406  Therefore, it
affirmed the lower court’s ruling that Ella was not entitled to take a
share of the estate.407
Nowadays, the stranger to the adoption rule is no longer followed
in most states.408  Thus, while a testator is free to exclude adoptees, he
or she must now do so expressly.409  The principal reason for this turn-







408 See Johns v. Cobb, 402 F.2d 636, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1968); In re Estate of Heard, 319
P.2d 637, 642-43 (Cal. 1957); Jackson v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 314 A.2d 178, 182 (Del. 1973);
Warner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 251 S.E.2d 511, 513 (Ga. 1978); Munie v.
Gruenewald, 124 N.E. 605, 606 (Ill. 1919); Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140, 142
(Iowa 1981); In re Will of Patrick, 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1960); In re Trs. of Har-
rington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 1977); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Mitchell, 251 A.2d
128, 129 (N.J. 1969); In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 399 (N.J. 1969); In re Estate of Park,
207 N.E.2d 859, 861 (N.Y. 1965); Simpson v. Simpson, 222 S.E.2d 747, 748 (N.C. Ct. App.
1976); Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. Green, 80 S.E.2d 771, 775 (N.C. 1954); Cent.Tr. Co. of
N. Ohio, N.A. v. Smith, 553 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ohio 1990); In re Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d
797, 800 (Pa. 1972); In re Estate of Sykes, 383 A.2d 920, 923 (Pa. 1978); Vaughn v.
Gunter, 458 S.W.2d 523, 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), aff’d, 461 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1970);
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 501 (W. Va. 1977); In re Tr. of
Adler, 140 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Wis. 1966).
409 See Munie v. Gruenewald, 124 N.E. 605, 607 (Ill. 1919); Solomon v. Cent. Tr. Co.,
584 N.E.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Ohio 1992); In re Sykes, 383 A.2d at 924.
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tates that an adopted child should sever all connection with his or her
biological family and instead become fully integrated into the adoptive
family.410
The California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Estate of Heard
was one of the first to discard the stranger to the adoption rule and
embrace a more inclusionary approach.411  In that case, Emma Heard, a
widow, executed a will in 1935 and died four years later, leaving a
brother and a son, John.412  In her will, Emma created a trust with John
as the principal income beneficiary.413  The trust also provided that at
John’s death, his income interest would be transferred to “his lawful is-
sue, if any.”414  At the death of the last income beneficiary, the trust
would terminate and the trust property would be delivered to the heirs
of John’s issue if any were living at that time.415  John died without issue
in 1955, but he and his wife adopted a child, John III, in 1950.416  Since
some of the other income beneficiaries were still alive at the time of
John’s death, the issue before the court was whether John III would
succeed to his income interest as John’s lawful issue.417
The court began by observing that
The over-all purpose [of the adoption laws] evidently was to
create a new legal relationship of parent and child which nor-
mally would be coupled with the natural relation of parent and
child springing from the fact that that is the relationship in
which they actually live; and to make the new legal relationship
legally the same as the old legal relationship of parent and
child which normally is coupled both with the genetic and fac-
tual relation of parent and child.418
The court went on to declare that since the status of an adopted child
was the same as a biological offspring under state law, it must assume,
unless the testator expressed an intent to the contrary, that she intended
the provisions of her will to be compatible with this policy.419  Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that “we do not find therein any indication
410 In re Heard, 319 P.2d at 641; Com. Tr. Co. v. Weed, 318 S.W.2d 289, 298 (Mo.
1958); see also In re Estate of Best, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (N.Y. 1985).




415 Id. at 639.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 639-40.
418 Id. at 641.
419 Id. at 642.
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that an adopted child was to be excluded in view of the public policy to
treat adopted children the same as blood children.”420
B. Adopted Persons as “Children,” “Descendants,” “Issue” and
“Heirs” in Class Gifts
Having concluded that most jurisdictions have adopted a presump-
tion, at least where minor adoptees are concerned, that settlors and tes-
tators usually intend to include adoptees as beneficiaries in class gifts, it
is now necessary to consider which, if any, words or phrases are suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption and thereby exclude adoptees.  These
include class gifts to (1) children, (2) descendants or issue; and (3) heirs,
next of kin or heirs of the body.  The right of minor adoptees will be
discussed first before considering adult adoptees.
1. Children
The term “children” seems to be more expansive than any of the
other words or phrases listed above and adopted children would seem to
fall within this category if not otherwise limited in some way.421  Be-
cause adopted children are considered to be children of their adoptive
parents, in the absence of any limiting language, a class gift by the adop-
tive parent to his or her “children” will almost always be deemed to
include adopted children.422  Furthermore, adoption statutes in many ju-
risdictions declare that adopted children can take as beneficiaries of
class gifts made to the “children” of their adopted parents.423  In other
states, court decisions have reached the same result without a statutory
mandate.424
In re Estate of Darling425 provides a good illustration of the modern
approach.  In that case, a testamentary trust established by Frances Dar-
420 Id. at 643.
421 But see Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Ky. 1965) (holding that the use of
the term “children” does not include adoptees, although terms like “heirs” and “heirs at
law” do).
422 See In re Appeal of Wildman, 151 A. 265, 266 (Conn. 1930).
423 See In re Estate of Darling, 365 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Neb. 1985); In re Estate of
Tafel, 296 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. 1972).
424 See Mooney v. Tolles, 149 A. 515, 519 (Conn. 1930); Munie v. Gruenewald, 124
N.E. 605, 607 (Ill. 1919); Meek v. Ames, 280 P.2d 957, 962 (Kan. 1955); In re Estate of
DeRoy, 392 A.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Pa. 1978).  However, this approach is not universal, and
in some of the earlier cases, the courts have not allowed adopted children to qualify
unless the settlor or testator has expressly included them as children. See Conn. Bank &
Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 902 (Conn. 1972); In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652, 654 (N.Y.
1910); Cent. Tr. Co. v. Hart, 80 N.E.2d 920, 927(Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Cochran v.
Cochran, 95 S.W. 731, 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); Decker v. Elliott, 425 S.W.2d 880, 883
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Murphy v. Slaton, 273 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tex. 1954).
425 365 N.W.2d 821 (Neb. 1985).
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ling provided that after the death of her son, David Darling, the trust
property would be divided among “the children of said David H. Dar-
ling who survive him.”426  Frances died in 1967.427  David was married
four times and had one child by his first marriage, another two by his
second marriage and a fourth child by his third marriage.  In 1977,
David adopted the four children of his fourth wife.428  David died in
1982 and his four adopted children claimed a share of the trust, while
David’s biological children disputed the adopted children’s claim.429
Relying on In re Clarke’s Estate,430 the biological children argued
that there was a presumption that children adopted after the death of a
testator were not meant to be included in any bequest to “children.”431
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a subsequently-en-
acted state statute overruled the Clarke case and provided that adopted
children should share in the trust in the same manner as biological chil-
dren even when they had been adopted after the testator’s death.432
2. Descendants, Lineal Descendants or Issue
The terms “descendants,” “lineal descendants” or “issue” have the
same meaning in legal parlance, namely a person’s lineal descendants by
blood.433  Many of the older cases excluded adopted children from a
beneficiary class when the beneficiaries were described as issue or de-
scendants of the adoptive parents, either because they adhered to the
stranger to the adoption rule434 or because they defined these terms ac-
cording to their traditional meaning.435  However, nowadays most
courts tend to either apply the modern presumption in favor of includ-
ing adoptees436 or to rely on expressions of state policy in adoption stat-




430 See In re Clarke’s Estate, 251 N.W. 279 (Neb. 1933).
431 See In re Estate of Darling, 365 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Neb. 1985).
432 Id. at 824.
433 See Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Hills, 254 A.2d 453, 455 (Conn. 1969); In re Estate of
Wehrhane, 128 A.2d 681, 682 (N.J. 1957).
434 See Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Conn. 1972); Fiduciary
Tr. Co. v. Silsbee, 187 A.2d 396, 400 (Me. 1963); In re Wehrhane, 128 A.2d at  683; Mealy
v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 445 P.2d 795, 797 (Okla. 1968).
435 See Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 17 A.2d 517, 519 (Conn. 1941); Ford v. Newman,
381 N.E.2d 292, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), aff’d, 396 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. 1979); Cont’l Ill. Nat’l
Bank & Tr. Co. v. Clancy, 163 N.E.2d 523, 526 (Ill. 1959); In re Estate of Graham, 150
N.W.2d 816, 817 (Mich. 1967); In re Wehrhane, 128 A.2d at 682-83; N.Y. Life Ins. & Tr.
Co. v. Viele, 55 N.E. 311, 314 (N.Y. 1899); Cent. Tr. Co. v. Hart, 80 N.E.2d 920, 925 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1948).
436 See In re Estate of Sykes, 383 A.2d 920, 923 (Pa. 1978).
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utes and elsewhere that consider adoptees to be full-fledged members of
their adoptive families.437
The Thompson case provides a good example of this latter ap-
proach.438  In that case, the testator’s will created a trust under which his
widow and four children received income from the trust, with a remain-
der to each child’s issue.439  After the testator’s death, one of his chil-
dren, Geraldine, and her husband adopted Roger Boone.  When
Geraldine died in 1949, the trustees decided to pay her share of the
income from the trust to her biological child, Peter, and to pay nothing
to Roger.440  When the testator’s widow died in 1967, the trustees
sought a ruling on whether Roger was entitled to receive a portion of
the trust corpus.441  The trial court concluded that Roger was not Geral-
dine’s issue insofar as the trust was concerned.442  On appeal, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, relying on the reasoning of In re Estate of Coe,443
held in favor of Roger.444  After reviewing the adoption statute and va-
rious decisions from the courts of other states, the court concluded that,
given the trend toward recognizing the rights of adopted children, the
testator would not have used the term “issue” if he desired to exclude
adopted children from the class of trust beneficiaries.445
3. Heirs and Next of Kin
At common law, the term “heir” referred to one who inherited a
decedent’s real property, while the term “nest of kin” referred to the
distributes of the decedent’s personal property under the civil law’s “de-
grees of kinship” approach.  However, these terms are now used more
or less interchangeably to refer to those who may inherit a share of a
decedent’s estate under the laws of descent and distribution.  In con-
trast, the term “heirs of the body” is more restrictive and refers to “off-
437 See Johns v. Cobb, 402 F.2d 636, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Mooney v. Tolles, 149 A.
515, 518 (Conn. 1930); In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 399 (N.J. 1969); In re Estate of
Park, 207 N.E.2d 859, 861 (N.Y. 1965); Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Musto, 181 N.E.2d 734,
735 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); In re Olney, 63 A. 956, 957 (R.I. 1906); Hartwell v. Tefft, 35 A.
882, 883 (R.I. 1899); In re Tr. of Adler, 140 N.W.2d 219, 225-26 (Wis. 1966).
438 In re Thompson, 250 A.2d at 393.
439 Id. at 394.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 Id. at 393.
443 201 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1964).
444 See In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 395 (N.J. 1969).
445 Id. However, adult adoptees are not necessarily given the same treatment, result-
ing in part from the “stranger to the adoption” rule. See In re Tr. of Vander Poel, 933
A.2d 628, 636-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
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spring, progeny, natural children, physically born and begotten by the
person named as a parent.”446
In the past, when the beneficiary class is defined as “heirs” or “next
of kin,” adoptees were often excluded under the stranger to the adop-
tion rule.447  However, minor adoptees are now typically included when
courts apply the modern presumption that favors adoptees.448
4. Biological Parents and Relatives
The modern view of adoption has generally precluded minor
adoptees from inheriting a share of the estates of biological parents or
other biological relatives who died intestate.  Of course, biological par-
ents and other blood relatives are free to make bequests in their wills to
those who have been adopted out of the family.  In some states, adop-
tion statutes address the issue as they do in cases of intestacy.  However,
in the absence of such statutory guidance or a clear directive in the will
or trust, the majority of courts allow adopted children to qualify as ben-
eficiaries under wills and trusts of their biological parents and rela-
tives,449 although a few have excluded them from doing so.450
C. Cases Involving Adult Adoptees
1. Class Gifts from Adoptive Relatives
Although the majority of courts have upheld the right of minor
adoptees to share in class gifts established in wills and trusts of members
of their adoptive families, they are not in agreement as to whether the
right to inherit should also extend to adult adoptees.451  A number of
446 See Comer v. Comer, 23 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ga. 1942); see also Delaney v. First Nat’l
Bank, 386 P.2d 711, 716 (N.M. 1963).
447 See Cook v. Underwood, 228 N.W. 629, 631 (Iowa 1930).
448 See Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Iowa 1981); U.S. Tr. Co. v. Hoyt,
135 N.Y.S. 849, 856 (App. Div. 1912).
449 See Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Coffin, 563 A.2d 1323, 1331 (Conn. 1989); Monroney
v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 435 A.2d 788, 796 (Md. 1981); Lockwood v. Adam-
son, 566 N.E.2d 96, 101 (Mass. 1991); In re Estate of Wolf, 236 A.2d 166, 170 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.1967); In re Estate of Lippincott, 532 N.Y.S.2d 1021, 1024 (Sur. Ct. Erie Cty.
1988); In re Estate of Zastrow, 166 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Wis. 1969).
450 See In re Estate of Russell, 95 Cal. Rptr. 88, 95 (Ct. App. 1971); In re Estate of
Best, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 1012-13 (N.Y. 1985).
451 See Estate of Pittman v. Tuffree, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (Ct. App. 1980); In re
Stanford, 315 P.2d 681, 708-09 (Cal. 1957); Abramovic v. Brunken, 94 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305
(Ct. App. 1971); In re Tr. Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 460 (Colo. App. 1991); Otto
v. Gore, 45 A.3d 120, 136-37 (Del. 2012); First Nat’l Bank v. Mackey, 338 N.W.2d 361,
365 (Iowa 1983); Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634, 634 (Ky. 1965); Wyeth v. Stone, 11
N.E. 729, 732 (Mass. 1887); First Nat’l Bank v. Sullivan, 394 S.W.2d 273, 283 (Mo. 1965);
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 14 A. 557, 558 (N.H. 1888); In re Estate of Nicol, 377 A.2d 1201, 1208
(N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1977); In re Estate of Comly, 218 A.2d 175, 178 (Gloucester
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courts have treated adult adoptees the same as minors as far as class
gifts are concerned.452  However, the majority of courts have not been
willing to allow adult adoptees to qualify for class gifts, particularly if
the adoption occurs after the settlor or testator’s death.453
Courts that treat adults and minors the same often base their deci-
sions on either statutory directives454 or evidentiary presumptions.455
For example, in In re Estate of Fortney, the court held that an adult
adoptee was a “child” and, therefore, fell within a statute that provided
that “an adopted child has the same rights of person and property as a
natural child of the person adopting would have.”456
A Delaware court in Chichester v. Wilmington Trust Co. also inter-
preted a state statute to allow two adult adoptees to take a share of a
class gift as the “issue” of their adoptive parents.457  This case involved
two trusts created by Philip Laird and a will executed by his wife, Lydia
Laird.458  Each instrument named the issue of Lydia’s mother, Eliza
Chichester, as beneficiaries.459  One of Eliza’s sons, Robert, adopted
two of his wife’s children by a prior marriage when they were adults.
After Lydia’s death, litigation ensued between the adoptees and Eliza’s
biological issue.460  The lower court ruled in favor of the adult
adoptees.461  The appellate court observed that the state adoption stat-
ute provided that adopted adults were to be treated as the lawful and
natural offspring of their adoptive parents.462  The court pointed out
that the adult adoptees could have taken a share of the Laird’s property
Cty. Ct. Prob. Div. 1966); In re Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 733 (Morris Cty. Ct.
Prob. Div. 1976); In re Estate of Goal, 551 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); In re
Estate of Ketcham, 495 A.2d 594, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); In re Estate of Kauffman,
506 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Hunt, 944 A.2d 846, 853 (R.I.
2008).
452 See Chichester v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 377 A.2d 11, 13 (Del. 1977); In re Estate of
Fortney, 611 P.2d 599, 604 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Evans v. McCoy, 436 A.2d 436, 449 (Md.
1981); In re Trs of Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 1977); Brock v. Dorman, 98
S.W.2d 672, 676 (Mo. 1936); Satterfield v. Bonyhady, 446 N.W.2d 214, 216 (Neb. 1989);
Delaney v. First Nat’l Bank, 386 P.2d 711, 716 (N.M. 1963); In re Chemical Bank, 395
N.Y.S.2d 917, 921 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
453 See In re Nicol, 377 A.2d at 1208; In re Comly, 218 A.2d at 178; In re Griswold,
354 A.2d at 733; In re Goal, 551 A.2d at  313.
454 See Chichester, 377 A.2d at 13; In re Fortney, 611 P.2d at 604; Satterfield, 446
N.W.2d at 216.
455 See Evans, 436 A.2d at 439-40; In re Harrington, 250 N.W.2d at 166.
456 611 P.2d 599, 604 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).
457 377 A.2d 11, 14 (Del. 1977).
458 Id. at 12.
459 Id.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 12.
462 Id. at 13 (citing DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 954 (2016)).
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as issue of Robert if they had been adopted by him as minors.463 Conse-
quently, it concluded that it should construe the statute “to require the
same result in the case of a child adopted as an adult.”464
Another approach is to apply the presumption in favor of inclusion
that applies to minor adoptees in many states.465  For example, in the
Trusts of Harrington case, Charles Harrington created several testamen-
tary trusts that provided income for the children of his daughter, Laura
Belle Hudson, “the issue of her body,” with a gift over to certain chari-
ties in the absence of such issue.466  The settlor died in 1928.467  Prior to
his death, Katherine and Edwin Dodge came to live with Laura Belle
and her husband as teenagers and were formally adopted by them in
1933 as adults.468  After Laura Belle’s death, Katherine and the heirs of
Edwin claimed to be beneficiaries under the trusts.469  The charitable
remaindermen contested this claim, arguing that Harrington did not in-
tend for adopted children of Laura Belle to benefit.470  The lower court
ruled that the adopted children were not Laura Belle’s issue and they
appealed.471
The appellate court observed that the state’s adoption statutes, be-
ginning in 1905, had provided that an adopted child “shall inherit from
his adopting parents or their relatives the same as though he were the
legitimate child of such parents.”472  The court also pointed out that an
earlier case, In re Holden’s Trust,473 had held that the word “issue” in a
testamentary provision should be construed to include adopted children
by virtue of the state’s adoption statutes “where a contrary intention is
not shown.”  Applying this presumption, the court concluded that the
trusts did not indicate that the testator intended to include only the bio-
logical children of Laura Belle.474
Those courts that have upheld the exclusion of adult adoptees have
also offered a number of rationales to support their position.  One argu-
ment is that adult adoptions are not the same as the adoption of minors
and, therefore, adult adoptees are not entitled to the same preferential
463 Id.
464 Id.
465 See Satterfield v. Bonyhady, 446 N.W.2d 214, 216 (Neb. 1989).




470 Id. at 164-165.
471 Id. at 164.
472 Id. at 165.
473 Id. (discussing In re Holden’s Tr., 291 N.W. 104, 111 (Minn. 1940)).
474 Id. at 167.
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treatment as minors.475  For example, a New Jersey appellate court took
this approach in In re Estate of Nicol.476  In 1939, Minnie Nicol died,
leaving her residuary estate in a testamentary trust for the benefit of her
sisters, as well as her children and grandchildren.477  In 1952, one of her
four children, Alexander Nicol, adopted the four adult children by a
prior marriage of his wife, Frances.478  Alexander died in 1961.479  When
it became time to distribute the trust corpus, Alexander’s adopted chil-
dren claimed a share on the theory that they were “issue or lineal de-
scendants” of Minnie.480  The lower court upheld the adoptees’ claim
and the other remaindermen appealed.481
Reversing the lower court’s judgment, the appellate court held that
Minnie did not intend to leave a share of the trust property to Alexan-
der’s adopted children.482  The court began by acknowledging that prior
decisions had rejected the stranger to the adoption rule by reasoning
that members of the adoptive family would not differentiate between a
natural child and one who had been adopted, but rather “the relation-
ships established by the parent would be accepted without discrimina-
tion on a biological basis.”483  In contrast, the court declared that it was
unlikely “that an adopted adult would be embraced in the bosom of
family members other than the adopting parent as would an adopted
child.”484  Accordingly, the court concluded that Minnie would not have
desired that her son’s adult adoptees share in her estate.485
Some courts have denied the right of an adult adoptee to qualify as
a class member unless a parent-child relationship existed prior to the
adoption.486  This approach is illustrated by In re Estate of Goal.487  In
that case, the will of Albert Goal provided that his two children, Helen
475 See In re of Estate of Nicol, 377 A.2d 1201, 1206-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977); In re Estate of Comly, 218 A.2d 175, 178 (Gloucester Cty. Ct. Prob. Div. 1966); In
re Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 726-27 (Morris Cty. Ct. Prob. Div. 1976); In re Ha-
gar’s Estate, 126 A. 507, 509 (Vt. 1924).
476 In re Nicol, 377 A.2d at 1206-08.
477 Id. at 1202-03.
478 Id. at 1203.
479 Id.
480 Id. at 1204.
481 Id. at 1203.
482 Id. at 1208.
483 Id. at 1204-06 (citing In re Coe, 201 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1964) and In re Thompson, 250
A.2d 393 (N.J. 1969)).
484 Id. at 1207-08.
485 Id. at 1208.
486 See First Nat’l Bank of Dubuque v. Mackey, 338 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Iowa 1983);
Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634, 634 (Ky. 1965); In re Estate of Kauffman, 506 A.2d
951, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); In re Estate of Goal, 551 A.2d 309, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
487 551 A.2d at 311 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988).
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and Robert, should receive income from a testamentary trust for their
lives.488 After the death of Helen and Robert, the trust income was to
be distributed to their issue.489  Robert died in 1987, survived by three
natural daughters and a son who had been adopted when he was 41
years old.490  The adoptee argued that he was Robert’s issue and, there-
fore, should receive a share of the trust income in accordance with the
terms of Albert’s will.491  On appeal, a Pennsylvania court agreed that
the state’s adoption statutes mandated that adopted children should
have the same rights as natural children.492  This policy was reflected in
the presumption that references in a will or trust to “children,” “issue”
and the like would include adoptees as well as biological kindred.493
However, the court also declared that it was contrary to public policy to
allow a beneficiary to frustrate a testator’s intent by adopting an adult
after his death.494
In the court’s view, the best way to achieve a balance between these
two policies was to limit the inclusionary presumption in adult adoption
cases to situations where a “parent-child” relationship existed between
the adoptive parent and the adult adoptee.  Quoting from In re Estate of
Kauffman,495 the court declared that
When an adoption is effectuated because of a parent-child re-
lationship, then it is logical for the court to presume that when
no contrary intent is shown, the testator would have wanted
the adopted child included in a legacy or bequest to “children.”
In such a case, the adopted person fits the meaning commonly
associated with the word “child,” and is no different from natu-
ral siblings except for the biological ties.  However, when no
parent-child relationship exists, and the adoption is effectuated
to secure an inheritance, it would not be logical to presume
that the testator would have intended the adoptee to be in-
cluded.  Accordingly, the court in construing the language of
the will will exclude such adult adoptees who had no parent-
child relationship from sharing a legacy or bequest to
“children.”496
488 Id. at 309.
489 Id. at 309-10.
490 Id. at 310.
491 Id.
492 Id. at 311.
493 Id.
494 Id. at 312.
495 See In re Estate of Kauffman, 506 A.2d 951, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
496 In re Estate of Goal, 551 A.2d 309, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citations omitted).
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Applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the court in In re Estate
of Goal observed that there was no evidence that Robert and the
adoptee had developed a parent-child relationship while the adoptee
was still a minor.497  Therefore, the court held that the adult adoptee
could not be treated as one of Robert’s issue.498
Finally, some courts are inclined to exclude adult adoptees from
sharing in class gifts if they suspect that the adoption was based on im-
proper motives.499 Otto v. Gore provides an interesting example of this
approach.500  In May and again in October of 1972, Wilbert (Bill) Gore,
the inventor of GORE-TEX® fabric, and his wife, Genevieve (Vieve),
executed Trust agreements for the benefit of their grandchildren, each
listing a considerable amount of company stock on Schedule A.501  The
two trusts purported to transfer the same property, but utilized different
distribution formulas.502  Susan Gore, one of Bill and Vieve’s five chil-
dren, married Jan Otto and had three children, Nathan, Jan and Joel.503
Each of the other siblings had four children so there were a total of 19
grandchildren.504
Susan and the Otto grandchildren tried to persuade Vieve and the
other grandchildren to change the Pokeberry Trust distribution formula
so that each grandchild would receive an equal share.505  When that ef-
fort failed, they devised another plan to increase the number of Otto
beneficiaries by having Susan adopt her ex-husband, Jan.506  At the time
the adoption was formalized in 2003, Jan was 65 years old.507 Jan origi-
nally agreed not to take anything from the Pokeberry Trust, thereby in-
creasing the respective shares of his children.508  However, he later
decided to keep his entire share from the Trust.509
After Vieve’s death in 2005, a controversy arose over whether the
May 1972 Trust was intended to be final and legally effective or whether
497 Id. at 313.
498 Id.
499 See Estate of Pittman v. Tuffree, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (Ct. App. 1980); Otto v.
Gore, 45 A.3d 120, 137 (Del. 2012); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 14 A. 557, 558 (N.H. 1888).
500 45 A.3d 120 (Del. 2012).
501 Id. at 124.
502 Id.  The Court of Chancery described the May trust as a “placeholder,” and the
Supreme Court opinion states that after executing the October trust, “Over the next forty
years, the settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries all believed that the October Instrument
governed the Pokeberry Trust.” Id. at 126-27.
503 Id. at 127.
504 Id. at 128.
505 Id.
506 Id.
507 Id. at 129.
508 Id. at 128-29.
509 Id. at 129.
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it was merely a preliminary draft.510  The Delaware Supreme Court held
that only the October 1972 instrument was effective.511  Having con-
cluded that the Pokeberry Trust’s assets would be distributed according
to the provisions of the October instrument, the court determined that
Jan would not be entitled to take a share as a “grandchild” of Bill and
Vieve.512  The lower court found that Susan adopted her ex-husband
“for the sole and improper purpose of thwarting or circumventing the
Gores’ intentions regarding the Pokeberry Trust.”513
On appeal, the Delaware court declared that it was appropriate to
consider the purpose of an adoption when deciding whether an adult
adoptee was entitled to take a share of the trust property.514  Quoting
from In re Adoption of Swanson, the court stated that “no court should
countenance an adoption to achieve a fraudulent, illegal or patently friv-
olous purpose.”515  According to the court in Otto, Jan’s adoption was
made solely to affect the distribution of the Pokeberry Trust in a way
that was contrary to the settlors’ intent.  The court reached this conclu-
sion on the following basis:
Nathan Otto attempted to convince Vieve to amend the Poke-
berry formula on her ninetieth birthday, but she rebuffed him.
Two weeks later, Jan C. Otto jokingly suggested that Susan
adopt him.  Within four months, Susan formally adopted Jan C.
as her son.  The timing of the adoption and the background
preceding it, are evidence that the adoption was pursued in or-
der to undermine the Gores’ intentions.  The fact that Susan
kept this adoption secret until Vieve died further evidences
that Susan and the Otto Grandchildren knew that they were
acting to thwart Vieve’s intentions.  Finally, Susan testified that
the purpose of the adoption was to be “purely a device to even
out Pokeberry” a result clearly contrary to the Gores’ goal of
equalizing expectations.516
Accordingly, the court held that Jan was not entitled to take a share of
the Pokeberry Trust.517
510 Id.
511 Id. at 130-35.
512 Id. at 137.
513 Id. at 136.
514 Id. at 137.
515 Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Del. 1993).
516 Id.
517 Id.
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VII. ADULT ADOPTION AND INHERITANCE RIGHTS RECONSIDERED
A. Inheritance Rights for Adoptees Under Existing Law
To summarize, both statutory law and judicial decisions allow mi-
nors to inherit from their adoptive parents when they die intestate.  In
addition, adopted children can generally inherit from other members of
their adoptive family by representation.  On the other hand, most courts
have interpreted their states’ adoption statutes to bar minor adoptees
from inheriting from their biological parents or from the rest of their
biological family.  Similar rules govern the right of minor adoptees to
partake of class gifts in the wills and trusts established by their adoptive
parents or by other members of their adoptive family.  At the same
time, courts are less willing to allow adopted minors to benefit from
class gifts established in the wills and trusts of their biological parents
and other biological family members.
However, inheritance rights are quite different where adult
adoptees are concerned.  Although courts have allowed adult adoptees
to inherit from their adoptive parents, they have generally refused to
permit adult adoptees to inherit from relatives of their adoptive families.
The same is true of class gifts.  Instead, the majority approach denies
adult adoptees the right to take a share of class gifts provided for in the
wills and trusts of other members of their adoptive family, particularly if
the adoption occurs after the death of the testator or settlor.
B. Public Policy Issues
Adoption and inheritance involve a number of public policy issues.
These policies are often embedded in state adoption and intestacy stat-
utes.  In addition, they are sometimes reflected in common law rules
involving wills and trusts.
1. Adoption Statutes
An important policy, one that is embodied in numerous statutes
and court opinions, is known as the “fresh start” principle.  According to
this principle, upon adoption, a minor child becomes a full-fledged
member of his or her adoptive family and is thereby entitled to the same
rights as any of the biological children of the adoptive parents.518  In
other words, an adopted child not only acquires new parents, but also
new siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins.519  As a result,
adopted children are permitted to inherit through, as well as from, their
518 See In re Newman’s Estate, 16 P. 887, 888 (Cal. 1888).
519 See Rein, supra note 31, at 721-22.
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adoptive parents.520 This applies to inheritance through intestacy as well
as the right to participate in class gifts in wills and trusts.
Another issue, which will be discussed in more detail below, is
whether the adoption process is suitable for every type of adult adoption
or whether it should be limited to adoptions that more or less replicate a
parent-child or family relationship.  If so, is it possible to develop a pro-
cess that fills this gap or should non-family inheritance rights be left to
intestacy laws and testamentary provisions?
2. Intestacy Statutes
Intestacy statutes historically restricted inheritance to blood rela-
tives of the decedent.521  The practice, still found in some states, that
“half-bloods” receive a reduced share is a throwback to the traditional
emphasis on bloodlines.522  Consequently, it is not surprising that judi-
cial interpretations of intestacy statutes in the past reflected the view
that decedents would prefer to benefit blood relations rather than unre-
lated parties.523  For this reason, in the past most courts refused to allow
adopted children to inherit through their adoptive parents.524  However,
in more recent times, the “fresh start” rationale of modern adoption
laws, along with the weakening concern about family bloodlines, has led
most courts to reconsider the status of adopted children and to allow
them to inherit as “issue” or “descendants” of their adoptive parents.
In addition, intestacy statutes generally have protected the interests
and reasonable expectations of members of the decedent’s immediate
family.  The most obvious example of this concern is the provision for
dower or its modern equivalent in common law intestacy statutes which
provides financial security to the surviving spouse if the decedent is mar-
ried.525  Statutory provisions for homestead, personal property set-
asides and family allowances also provide a safety net for the decedent’s
family.526  Furthermore, the decedent’s children (or their issue) are al-
most always the first takers of the decedent’s estate.
520 See McClure v. Noble, 602 So. 2d 377, 378 (Ala. 1992); In re Estate of Carlton,
348 So. 2d 896, 896 (Fla. 1977); In re Taylor’s Estate, 285 N.W. 538, 541 (Neb. 1939).
521 See Rein, supra note 31, at 721-22.
522 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-2 (2016).
523 See Conn.Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Conn. 1972); Lutz v.
Fortune, 759 N.E.2d 77, 81-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
524 See Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill. 26, 35-36 (1881); Batcheller-Durkee v. Batch-
eller, 97 A. 378, 380 (R.I. 1916).
525 Dower rights are not necessary in community property states since community
property is divided equally at the death of the first spouse.
526 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-402 to 2-404 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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3. Wills and Trusts
There are several policies embodied in the law of wills and trusts
that are also relevant to adoption cases.  First and foremost is the princi-
ple of freedom of disposition.  Except in extreme cases, most courts be-
lieve that they should carry out the testator’s wishes when they are
clearly expressed, no matter how unfair or misguided they appear to
be.527  In addition, there are a number of doctrines in the law of wills
that attempt to carry out a testator’s presumed intent by “filling in the
gaps” when unforeseen circumstances intervene.  For example, anti-
lapse statutes prevent a bequest from lapsing when a beneficiary prede-
ceases the testator.528  In addition, children born after the execution of
the will are protected by pretermitted child statutes.529  Finally, the doc-
trine of ademption by satisfaction, like the concept of advancements in
the case of intestacy, helps to ensure that each member of a beneficiary
class will be treated the same.530
Courts also purport to respect the settlor’s intent when they inter-
pret inter vivos and testamentary trusts.531  For example, spendthrift
provisions applicable to third-party beneficiaries are still enforced in
most states.532  In addition, notwithstanding the wishes of the benefi-
ciaries, courts are usually reluctant to modify or terminate testamentary
or irrevocable trusts without good reason.533  Furthermore, under the
influence the Uniform Trust Code,534 courts are now increasingly likely
to enforce honorary or purpose trusts for pets and other non-charitable
purposes.535
527 See Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
528 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603.
529 See id. § 2-302.  At the same time, other policies sometimes trump a testator’s
intent.  Thus, for example, virtually all common law states allow a surviving spouse to
elect against the will and take a larger share than the decedent’s will provides.
530 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-612 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
531 See In re Tr. Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 459 (Colo. App. 1991); Elliott v.
Hittleson, 303 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Iowa 1981); In re Trs. of Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 165
(Minn. 1977).
532 See Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial
Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 150-52 (2007).
533 See Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand:
The Modification and Termination of “Irrevocable” Trusts, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J.
237, 243-244 (2015).
534 See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 407-08 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
535 See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Purpose of Purpose Trusts, 18 REAL PROP. TR.
& EST. L.J. 34 (2004).
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C. Adult Adoption and Public Policy
Each of these policies—facilitation of a fresh start for adopted chil-
dren, deference to the decedent’s actual or presumed intent, and protec-
tion of the reasonable expectations of the decedent’s family—arguably
support the right of minor adopted children to inherit from and through
their adoptive parents.  The fresh start theory mandates equal treatment
of adopted children along with other children of the adoptive parents; it
is reasonable to assume that other members of the adoptive family
would regard adopted children as full-fledged family members; and it is
consistent with the policy of recognizing the reasonable expectations of
the decedent’s family to treat adopted children as heirs and
beneficiaries.
However, these policies do not necessarily apply to adult adoptees.
Since adult adoptees typically retain strong ties to their biological family
and, therefore, are not fully integrated into the family of their adoptive
parent, the fresh start theory seems inapplicable to adult adoptees.  Be-
cause an adult adoptee is not necessarily integrated into the adoptive
parent’s family, there is no reason to assume that other members of the
family would want them to inherit under wills, trusts or intestacy
laws.536  Nor is it self-evident that adopted adults have a reasonable ex-
pectation of inheriting from members of their adoptive family, particu-
larly if they can reasonably expect to inherit from members of their
biological family.
There are other reasons to question whether adult adoptees should
be able to inherit as a matter of course from members of their adoptive
families.  In particular, unlike childhood adoptions, which are generally
based on altruistic motives, adult adoptions are often motivated by eco-
nomic or other strategic considerations.537  In such cases, where a strong
relationship does not exist between the adult adoptee and the adoptive
family, a per se rule that allows adoptees to inherit from either their
adoptive parents or other members of their adoptive family may not be
appropriate538  Instead, a more nuanced approach should be considered.
D. Distinguishing Among Various Types of Adult Adoption
1. “Familial” Adult Adoptions
One approach is to condition inheritance rights for adult adoptees
on a requirement that the parties to the adoption truly intend to repli-
cate some sort of family relationship.  An earlier portion of this Article
536 See In re Estate of Goal, 551 A.2d 309, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
537 See Ratliff, supra note 6, at 1781.
538 See Estate of Pittman v. Tuffree, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (Ct. App. 1980); Otto v.
Gore, 45 A.3d 120, 137 (Del. 2012); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 14 A. 557, 558 (N.H. 1888).
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described various types of adult adoption scenarios.539  For example,
some adult adoptions are intended to formalize pre-existing informal
parent-child relationships.  Other adoptions are based on a preexisting
family relationship, as when a close relative adopts the child of another
family member.540  A third form involves the adoption of a stepchild by
the spouse of the adoptee’s parent.  Although only the first type of
adoption is based on the existence of a true parent-child relationship,
the other two are based on pre-existing family relationships that repli-
cate the parent-child relationship, at least to some extent.  These three
categories may be collectively described as “familial” adoptions, since
the adult adoptee is not adopted by strangers, but is further integrated
into the existing family.  Moreover, familial adoptions resemble tradi-
tional adoptions in the sense that they are principally motivated by al-
truistic rather than purely economic objectives.
2. Adoptions Involving Same-Sex Couples
Adoptions between same sex couples are also typically motivated,
at least to some extent, by altruistic objectives.541  However, they are
different from familial adoptions because they are primarily viewed as
proxies for marriage rather than a means of establishing a parent-child
or familial relationship between the parties.  Unlike the case with a fa-
milial adoption, the adoptee’s principal relationship will normally re-
main with his or her partner and the adoptee’s biological family, and not
necessarily extend to the partner’s family.
3. Adult Adoptions Based on Affinity
Another type of adult adoption is based on affinity, that is, an altru-
istic friendship between two persons that is not obviously sexual in na-
ture.  Usually, but not always, one party is the sponsor or mentor of the
other.  Also, the parties may differ substantially in age,542 although in
some cases there may be little or no age difference between them.543
4. Adult Adoption for the Purpose of Creating Inheritance Rights
Finally, an adult adoption may be solely or primarily concerned
with creating inheritance rights for one or both of the parties.  These
539 See Ratliff, supra note 6, at 1781.
540 See, e.g., Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518 (Mass. 1898); In re Mullaney’s Adop-
tion, 25 Pa. C. C. 561 (Ct. Com. Pl. Huntingdon Cty. 1901).
541 See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1993); Ex Parte Libertini,
224 A.2d 433 (Md. 1966).
542 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Sewall, 51 Cal. Rptr. 367, 371 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
543 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Elizabeth P.S. by Eileen C., 509 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Fam.
Ct. 1986).
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types of adoptions include adoptions between spouses, adoptions be-
tween unmarried heterosexual couples and some adoptions between un-
related adults.  These adoptions have little in common with traditional
adoptions because they are not intended to replicate a conventional
family structure.  Rather, like adoptions in ancient Rome, they are stra-
tegic in nature and the essential relationship between the parties is con-
tractual rather than familial in character.
E. Proposed Inheritance Rules
Keeping in mind the fact that a decedent can provide for an
adoptee, whether a minor or an adult, by executing a valid will, I would
propose a default rule that would confine inheritance rights to adult
adoptees who truly become members of the adoptive parents’ family.
Other adult adoptees would inherit from members of their adoptive
families only if they were expressly provided for in a will or trust.  In-
deed, it might be better to devise a separate process for these arrange-
ments call them something besides adoption.
1. “Familial” Adult Adoptions
a. Adoptions Involving a Pre-existing Parent-Child
Relationship
This type of relationship is very close to the typical situation that
most adoption statutes contemplate when an adult adopts a minor child.
Because there is a pre-existing parent-child or family relationship, it is
reasonable to assume that the adoptees will have already been fully inte-
grated into the adoptive family by the time an adoptive parent or rela-
tive dies.  Arguably, when this type of adoption occurs, the adult
adoptee should have all of the rights that a biological child would have,
including the right to inherit from and through his or her adoptive
parents.
At the same time, unlike with the adoption of a minor, an adult
adoptee may also remain in contact with his or her biological family.  If
that is the case, should an adoptee also retain the right to inherit from or
through his or her biological parents?  Allowing an adult adoptee to
retain the right to inherit from his or her biological parents appears to
be inconsistent with the “fair share” policies that are embodied in intes-
tacy statutes as well as the law of wills.  Furthermore, the existence of a
pre-existing parent-child relationship makes it unlikely that the adoptive
child will have maintained close ties with his or her biological family.
On balance, therefore, the better default rule might be to bar an adult
adoptee from inheriting from members of his or her biological family.
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b. Adoptions Involving a Pre-existing Family Relationship
A second situation is where a family member wishes to adopt an
adult relative.544  This arrangement also resembles a conventional adop-
tion in some respects.  Although there is no pre-existing parent-child
relationship between the parties, there is a pre-existing family relation-
ship so the adoptee is not a complete stranger to the bloodline.  This
supports the conclusion that an adult adoptee under these circumstances
should be able to inherit from and through his or her adoptive parents.
One can also argue that the adoptee should be permitted to inherit
from and through his or her biological parents since they are likely to
have maintained a close relationship after the adoption.  However, in
some situations, a dual inheritance problem may arise.  This means that
person attempts to inherit as both an adoptee and a biological relative
of the decedent as when a person adopted by his grandfather seeks to
inherit as both the adopted son and the biological grandson of his grand-
father.545  As in the case of minor adoptees, the better approach is to
disallow dual inheritance.
c. Stepchild Adoptions
Although most stepchild adoptions involve minors, it is possible for
a stepparent to adopt an adult stepchild.546  Once again, in most cases,
the adult adoptee will probably continue to maintain a normal relation-
ship with his or her biological family.  Accordingly, as far as inheritance
rights are concerned, adult adoptees should be treated the same as
adopted minors.  In other words, an adult adoptee should be able to
inherit from the adoptive parent and his or her spouse.  In addition, the
adult adoptee should be allowed to inherit from the divorced or de-
ceased biological parent where a prior parent-child relationship existed
between them prior to the adoption.547
2. Adoptions between Same Sex Couples
In the past, same sex couples sometimes used adoption as a mar-
riage substitute.  Not only did this form of adoption provide some sort
of legal recognition of their relationship, but it offered the prospect of
inheritance rights from the other same-sex partner, and possibly from
his or her relatives.  However, adoption within a same-sex couple in no
544 See Messler, supra note 3, at 1051-52.
545 See, e.g., In re Wilson’s Estate, 33 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1934); Wagner v. Varner, 50
Iowa 532 (1879); In re Bartram’s Estate, 198 P. 192 (Kan. 1921); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 990
So. 2d 807 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); In re Benner’s Estate, 166 P.2d 257 (Utah 1946).
546 See In re Estate of Brittin, 664 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
547 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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way resembled a conventional adoption since the underlying relation-
ship was a sexual one rather than that of a parent and child.  Now that
the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of same sex marriages, it is
unlikely that same-sex couples will continue to view adoption as an ac-
ceptable substitute for marriage.  However, if a member of a same sex
couple does adopt the other in the future, the adoption should not cre-
ate inheritance rights to the property of third parties.  By the same to-
ken, the adoption should not affect existing inheritance rights to the
property of members of either party’s biological family.
3. Adoptions Based on Affinity or Economic Advantage Other
Than Inheritance
Unrelated adults sometimes use adoption to publicly declare their
friendship and affection for each other,548 to prevent a will contest,549 or
to gain some economic benefit.550  In such cases, there is no parent-child
relationship or other family connection.  Accordingly, it seems that
neither party should be allowed to inherit from the other except under
the terms of a valid will or trust. However, instead, both parties should
retain the right to inherit from and through their respective biological
families.
4. Adoption for the Purpose of Creating or Increasing
Inheritance Rights
Many adult adoptions are made solely for the purpose of creating
inheritance rights.  While there is nothing wrong with two parties creat-
ing inheritance rights between themselves, they can do so by making a
will contract and do not need to have one party adopt the other.  Using
the adoption process to create or increase inheritance rights in the prop-
erty of third parties is even more problematic and contrary to many of
the policies that were discussed above.
548 See In re Adoption of Elizabeth P.S., 509 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
549 See In re Moore’s Estate, 47 P.2d 533, 534 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935); In re Estate
of Goulart, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Warren v. Prescott, 24 A. 948 (Me.
1892); Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 41 N.W.2d 217 (N.D. 1950).
550 See Coker v. Celebrezze, 241 F. Supp. 783, 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (attempted
adoption to qualify for Social Security benefits); In re Adoption of P, 471 A.2d 1220, 1220
(N.J. Super. Ct.  Law Div. 1983) (college professor seeking to adopt student in order to
qualify him for free tuition); 333 E. 53d St. Assocs. v. Mann, 503 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (App.
Div. 1986) (one tenant adopting another to benefit from rent control regulations).
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a. Adoptions between Spouses
Although a few states prohibit the adoption of spouses,551 it is ap-
parently possible to adopt a spouse in at least some states.552  However,
when one spouse adopts another, the resulting relationship does not re-
semble a traditional adoption.  In particular, since the adopted spouse
does not become part of the adopting spouse’s family (other than being
an in-law), there is no reason to grant any inheritance rights as a result
of such an adoption.  A spouse who desires to make a provision for the
other spouse is free to do so by will.  Moreover, since the adopted
spouse will continue to maintain a relationship with his or her biological
family, he or she should also retain whatever inheritance rights that flow
from that relationship.
b. Adoptions between Unmarried Heterosexual Couples
The same analysis applies to unmarried heterosexual couples.
Adoptions of this sort are relatively rare and are almost always finan-
cially motivated.553  As in the case of a same-sex couple, the essence of
the relationship is sexual, not parental, and, therefore, adoption is a
poor fit for such an arrangement.  Consequently, this sort of adoption
should not create any inheritance rights to the property of the adoptee’s
partner or that of any member of the partner’s family.  However, once
again, this arrangement should have no effect on inheritance rights to
the property of either party’s biological family.
c. Adoptions between Unrelated Parties to Create Inheritance
Rights from a Third Party
A great number of adult adoptions are intended to create or affect
the inheritance rights of one or both parties.554  Although this practice is
not necessarily fraudulent or deceitful, it appears to have little connec-
tion with the true purpose of adoption.  It certainly does not promote
the “fresh start” policy of adoption, nor in most cases is it likely to carry
out a third-party  decedent’s actual or presumed intent.  Indeed, this
sort of adoption is usually intended to frustrate or distort this intent by
adding an unexpected heir or beneficiary to share in the decedent’s es-
tate.  Not only is this result likely to be contrary to the decedent’s intent,
but it also interferes with the reasonable expectations of other family
members.  Consequently, in the absence of an express agreement, the
551 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5-101(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 109-10 (1994); MONT. CODE
§ 42-4-402 (1) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.190 (1) (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-103
(2016).
552 See, e.g., Bedinger v. Graybill’s Ex’r, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
553 See, e.g., Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 295 S.W. 896, 896 (Ky. 1927).
554 See Ratliff, supra note 6, at 1781.
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parties should not be able to inherit from each other or from other
members of the other party’s family either by intestacy or as benefi-
ciaries of a class gift.
VIII. OTHER ISSUES
Although this Article is primarily concerned with inheritance
rights, there are some ancillary issues that are worth discussing.  One
issue involves the appropriate formalities for adult adoption.  Another
issue is what form of notice should be required to any affected third
parties.  A third issue is what sort of procedure should be required to
terminate an adoptive relationship.  Finally, there is the question of
whether much of the terminology associated with adult adoption should
be reexamined.
A. Formalities
The process of adoption for minors is usually set forth in some de-
tail in each state’s adoption statute.  Typically, adoption involves a judi-
cial proceeding that is principally concerned with the best interests of
the adopted child.  This inquiry largely focuses on the fitness of the
adoptive parents.  The adoptive process is usually much simpler in the
case of adult adoption since none of these issues is particularly relevant
to the adoption of an adult.  Therefore, it makes sense to reduce the
adoption process to a bare minimum.  A petition, coupled with a short
appearance by the parties in the judge’s chambers, should be sufficient
in most cases.  Even that formality might be omitted in the case of an
adoption that is solely for the purpose of creating inheritance rights.
Since this form of adoption is more analogous to a contract to make a
will, perhaps it should not require a formal court proceeding.
B. Notice
Who, if anyone, should be notified when one adult adopts another?
Although a minor adoptee’s biological parents must be notified, if possi-
ble, and given an opportunity to contest the proposed adoption, that
does not seem to serve any useful purpose when an adult is adopted.
On the other hand, since “familial” adoptions potentially affect the in-
heritance rights of the adoptee’s biological family, it seems desirable
that they be notified in some way.  There are various options ranging
from transmission of the order of adoption to publication of a “tomb-
stone notice” in a local newspaper.
As far as family members and other interested parties may be con-
cerned, one can assume that the adopting parties will notify them infor-
mally.  However, in the case of other types of adoption, notice to others
may not be necessary if the adoption only affects the inheritance rights
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of the parties themselves.  Once again, since this arrangement is like a
contract or a will substitute (for which notice to others is not required)
rather than an adoption, it is doubtful that notice requirement would
serve any useful purpose.
C. Termination of the Adoptive Relationship
Traditionally, because adoption was thought to involve the integra-
tion of the adoptee into a new family, it was very difficult to rescind or
terminate.555  Usually family members rather than one of the adoptive
parties sought to invalidate the adoption on grounds of fraud, undue
influence or failure to follow the prescribed procedures.  While there is
good reason to maintain this high bar where the adoption of a minor
child is involved, it serves no purpose in the case of an adult adoption.
Perhaps where a “familial” adoption is concerned, the adoptive relation-
ship should be terminated by a judicial decree with an appearance by
one or both parties.  However, in other cases, if the rights of third par-
ties are not affected, perhaps either party should have the power to ter-
minate the relationship by written notice to the other.
D. Terminology
Many of the terms and concepts used in the adoption process do
not accurately describe the relationships involved in an adult adoption.
This is particularly true of non-familial adult adoptions.  Thus, while it
may be appropriate to refer to one party as a “parent” and the other as
a “child” in the context of a familial adult adoption, it makes no sense
when a member of a same sex couple adopts the other or when two
middle-aged adults go through an adoption procedure in order to create
inheritance rights.  It is purely arbitrary to describe one party as the
“parent” and the other as the “child.”  Likewise, it is inaccurate to de-
scribe a relationship between equals as “parental” in nature.  Nor is one
party really “adopting” the other in the sense of making the adoptee a
family member.  Instead, perhaps the term “adoption” should be re-
stricted to traditional adoptions and, possibly in the case of adults, to
familial adoptions.
One criticism of this approach is that it excludes those who do not
qualify for a familial adoption from participating in an adoption process.
Should they be allowed to opt for a traditional adoption and refer to
each other as parent and child even though these terms are not truly
descriptive of their underlying relationship?  Although it is a fiction to
characterize any type of non-familial relationship as parental in nature,
it probably does no harm as long as inheritance rights are not affected.
555 Roman, supra note 91, at 738.
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Therefore, a state should be free to recognize a form of optional “quasi
adoption” status for these parties if it wishes to do so.
IX. CONCLUSION
Many adult adoption statutes contain language, requirements and
restrictions that may be relevant to the adoption of minors, though are
not appropriate in the context of adult adoptions.  This is particularly
true when the adoption is not intended to replicate a traditional family
structure.  In addition, adult adoption statutes seldom set forth the in-
heritance rights of adoptees.  This Article suggests that adult adoption
statutes should distinguish between familial adult adoptions and those
that are primarily motivated by other objectives.  Therefore, it has pro-
posed different rules regarding inheritance rights for each of these types
of adoption.

